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ABSTRACT
Within this dissertation, I examine how behaviors are affected by and affect
education decisions. Within the first chapter, I examine how infectious disease
impacted school enrollment behaviors in a historical context. Both the second
and third chapters focus on college financing decisions. The second chapter
explores how student loan uptake impacts the retirement behaviors of parents of
students. The third chapter examines if and how large-scale merit aid
scholarships affect student loan uptake.
In the first chapter, I analyze the effect of poliomyelitis outbreaks on
school enrollment choices. This chapter adds to a growing literature on avoidance
behavior within health economics, which focuses on how the fear of a disease
changes behavior and creates additional costs. I find support for the idea that
polio outbreaks resulted in lower likelihood of school enrollment for
kindergarten-aged children and particularly for kindergarten-aged children with
stay-at-home mothers. This result implies the channel for avoidance behavior is
the ability to change behavior, here as a result either of a child’s age or a family’s
income structure.
In the second chapter, coauthored with Celeste Carruthers, we look at an
unstudied topic within the student loan literature: how student loans influence
parents of students. We examine the effect of student loan presence on several
dimensions of retirement behaviors. We find that student loan presence results in
significantly fewer dollars in retirement savings, later expected retirement age,
and a higher likelihood of being employed and in the labor force in some
specifications. However, there is evidence these results are driven by
unobservables.
In the third chapter, I examine the effect of large-scale merit aid programs
on a broad measure of household debt. This debt measure includes student loan
debt, credit card debt, medical bills, legal bills, and loans from relatives. Previous
literature found large-scale merit aid programs result in lower a likelihood of
student loan uptake and lower amounts of student loan debt. I employ a
difference-in-difference strategy to exploit differences over time and states in the
introduction of the programs. I do not find that these programs result in changes
in student loan uptake or amount.
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CHAPTER 1
SOMETHING TO FEAR OTHER THAN FEAR ITSELF
“… first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is
fear itself...”
-- Franklin D. Roosevelt
“Everyone was afraid of polio, especially those who saw it all the time … In at
least two instances during polio epidemics, hospital staff were felled by their own
contagion of what turned out to be hysterical paralysis, brought on by fear.”
-- Patenting the Sun, Jane S. Smith

Introduction
Some public health threats may be costly because these threats create anxiety
that induces behavioral change. A public health threat with rare but severe
outcomes may induce larger behavioral responses than anticipated from a
rational and risk neutral populace. The economic epidemiology literature refers
to these changes as avoidance or aversion behavior. How large could the
avoidance behavior induced by anxiety surrounding a severe public health threat
be? I examine this question about avoidance behavior in the context of
poliomyelitis in mid-century America by answering a more specific question: did
polio induce changes in five-and six-year-olds’ school enrollment behavior and, if
so, how large were those behavioral changes? I examine behavioral changes in
this context because polio was a disease with a striking tail end risk (paralysis)
the population at large was documented to be frightened of, and were particularly
frightened of it affecting five- to nine-year-olds (Sirkin, 1960). In this case, if
parents engaged in aversion behavior to limit their child’s exposure to polio,
parents would limit their own child’s exposure to a peer populace where polio is
believed to be circulating. School is the most likely place where a young child
would be exposed to their peers, and parents would have the most discretion over
five- and six-year-olds’ enrollment since kindergarten was optional during the
time I examine. Further, families with stay-at-home mothers and kindergartenaged children would have additional discretion to keep the child at home.
I analyze parents’ responsiveness to the uncertainty represented by a polio
outbreak through the impact of reported state-level polio incidence rates on
individual enrollment decisions for kindergarten-aged children. I postulate
avoidance behavior will be the most pronounced for families with more discretion
over such decisions. I examine this possibility in two ways: (1) I compare the
impact of polio on the enrollment decisions for five- and six-year-olds to the
impact of polio on seven- and eight-year-olds and nine- and ten-year-olds and (2)
I compare the impact of polio on five- and six-year-olds in a family with a stay-at1

home mother to the impact of polio on five- and six-year-olds in a family with
dual incomes. In both cases, I find evidence that families with additional
discretion displayed more avoidance behavior, regardless of if this discretion
stemmed from a child’s age or family structure. I conclude avoidance behavior
can have large impacts at the individual-level and is especially pronounced when
such behavior is relatively low cost for the individual or family.
The reasons for studying kindergarteners are twofold: (1) children around
this age range were understood to be the prime age to become infected with
symptomatic polio,1 and (2) kindergarten remains optional in most states,
suggesting parents had additional discretion over these children’s school
enrollment.2
The purpose of the analysis is to document behavioral change created by
fear of a disease rather than to estimate the full welfare effects of this particular
behavioral change. Such a welfare estimate would require assumptions about (1)
if parents on average were delaying their children’s kindergarten entrance or
skipping kindergarten enrollment all together and (2) the benefits of attending
kindergarten in mid-century America. In a modern context, research has shown
that enrollment decisions for this age group may have large impacts on children
later in life. Fitzpatrick et al (2010) suggest an additional year of schooling in
kindergarten or first grade results in a gain of a standard deviation in both
reading and math. Berlinski et al (2008) finds that preprimary attendance
reduces levels of grade repetition later. Attending formal kindergarten or
remaining at home, rather than attending informal daycare, has been found to
have positive impacts on children’s test scores in later childhood (Feinstein,
Robertson & Symons, 1999). Cascio (2009), the one paper I am aware of that
explores the benefits of kindergarten in a historical context, finds that increased
kindergarten availability in the 1960s and 1970s decreased the likelihood that
White children would be imprisoned later in life and increased the likelihood
White children would graduate high school. She does not find similar results for
Black children, and she does not find effects on earnings, labor supply, or the
receipt of government benefits, possibly because kindergarten during this earlier
time period was comparatively low intensity. Whether the results from this
literature apply in the context of the 1940s through 1960s is an open question for
future research.
What could be the educational impact be of a disease with high profile but
rare and severe outcomes, like paralysis from polio? The highest annual polio
case count ever recorded in the US in a year was 52,870 in 1952. The likelihood
that a person who contracts poliovirus will be paralyzed for any length of time is
less than 1% (Center for Disease Control, 2016). Regardless, parents checked
newspapers daily to see if there was a polio outbreak in their community or state
(Rustein, 1957; Smith, 1990). Schools, churches, movie theaters, and swimming
Children five- to nine-years-old were designated as the first priority group for polio vaccination
in 1955 (Sirken & Brenner, 1960).
2 See Table 5.3: Types of state and district requirements for kindergarten entrance and
attendance, by state: 2014 (National Center for Education Statistics, 2015).
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pools routinely closed for the duration of polio outbreaks (Smith, 1990). Fear of
infectious diseases with severe outcomes has not waned since the mid-century: in
the 1980s, a school board barred Ryan White, a hemophiliac who contracted
AIDS, from attending school even when authorities knew the likelihood White
would spread the disease was miniscule (Specter, 1985). Further, during the Zika
outbreak of 2016, presidential candidates lauded the idea of quarantining
individuals from countries with Zika outbreaks despite calls from public health
officials such measures would have little benefit (Maron, 2016). If public health
threats cause such anxiety, such indirect impacts only make them costlier.
I look at the impact of uncertainty and associated avoidance behavior
surrounding polio on kindergarten enrollment with individual-level pooled
ordinary least squares analysis. Using individual-level Census data from 1940,
1950, and 1960, I determine the impact of an increase in the polio incidence rate
in a state during the previous twelve months on the likelihood a kindergarten-age
child will have attended kindergarten in that same state in a given time span
prior to a reference date given by the Census. In 1950 and 1960, this time span is
the two months before February 1; in 1940, this time span is one month before
March 1. Following Bleakley (2007), I take this mid-year attendance as a signal of
enrollment. I use a conservative measure of a state-year’s average 1 in 100,000
incidence rate of polio in the twelve months before the reference date for a given
Census. I create this average twelve-month incidence rate using weekly incidence
rates of polio from Project Tycho (van Panhuis et al, 2013) and only include stateyears with 75% or more non-missing state-week observations. In the analyses, I
include personal and family controls and state-level controls for education, public
sanitation, and crude birth rates from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census
Bureau 1942, 1943, 1946, 1952, 1953, 1962a, 1962b, & 1963).
In these analyses, I assume reported polio incidence rates are exogenous
to kindergarten enrollment decisions once I condition on observables. False
inference will result in the presence of any endogenous channel impacting both
kindergarten enrollment and reported incidence rates. Several aspects of the
analyses mitigate this possibility. Of foremost importance is the high variability
of polio incidence rates in different years in each state. Polio incidence rates
increased from 1940 to 1950, but subsequently declined with the invention of
polio vaccines in 1955 and 1960. Although all states display this relationship, they
do so with high levels of volatility suggesting that polio incidence rate spikes
functioned as exogenous shocks. To guard further against the possibility of
endogeneity, I include epidemiological drivers of polio in all analyses. In
addition, I present falsification and robustness tests for the main analyses, and I
show that polio has the largest impacts for children whose families had the most
discretion over the child’s enrollment decisions.
I find evidence polio significantly impacted the enrollment decisions for
the age group that mid-century parents had the most discretion over (five- to sixyear-olds). Moreover, the coefficients of interest are more significant and have
greater magnitude when the analyses focus on families with additional flexibility
because of the presence of a homemaker to take care of a child who is not
3

enrolled in school. Families with dual incomes do not have significant coefficients
of interest at any level in any specification. The results of the analyses suggest
polio created a pattern of avoidance behavior resulting in negative impacts on
school enrollment for children in the age range to attend kindergarten. The main
results hover between marginal significance and insignificance but suggest an
additional new case of polio out of 100,000 people in the average week may have
decreased kindergarten enrollment by 4 percentage points. Results for families
with a stay-at-home mother imply that for this subpopulation, one additional
case of population-adjusted polio in the average week decreased the likelihood a
child would be enrolled in kindergarten by a little less than 5 percentage points.
The implication is that avoidance behavior can be quite strong in response to an
illness with severe but rare outcomes especially when such responses are less
costly.

Background
The History of Polio
Poliomyelitis is a viral infection that enters through the mouth and multiplies in
the gastrointestinal tract, eventually being spread and expelled through feces.
Polio is spread primarily through the oral-fecal route so proper sanitation
impacts the disease’s spread.3
Current belief is that polio’s method of contagion (the oral-fecal route) is
central to understanding the epidemics that arose in developed nations in the late
nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century. A commonly accepted
hypothesis is that prior to modern sanitation, polio existed at subclinical levels
throughout the population:
In unsanitary conditions … children are more uniformly infected very early
in life and are more likely to experience mild disease. It has been proposed
that the late-nineteenth-century invention of modern plumbing and
sewage containment led to the shift toward epidemic polio by preventing
widespread infantile exposure to mild poliovirus. Once someone has been
infected with poliovirus, lifelong immunity develops that prevents future
reinfection. The prevention of common infantile polio subsequently
allowed children to be infected with more virulent strains later in life.
(Kunschner, 2008, p. 547)
This popular theory of the polio’s sudden appearance in the late nineteenth
century is called the hygiene hypothesis. More recently, increases in the birth rate
in developed nations, rather than increases in public sanitation, have been
proposed as the mechanism that gave rise to epidemic polio during the late
nineteenth century (Martinez-Bakker & Rohani, 2015).
Even in a polio epidemic, paralysis is not a common outcome for infected
individuals; polio rarely manifests itself this intensely. Out of the people in the
Some oral-oral transfer is hypothesized but is not viewed to be the main method of the disease’s
spread (Center for Disease Control, 2016).
3
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population who contract poliovirus, most (up to 72%) exhibit no symptoms
(Center for Disease Control, 2015). Twenty-four percent of people who contract
poliovirus experience mild symptoms including “fever, headache, and sore
throat” (Kunschner, 2008; Center for Disease Control, 2015). Fewer than 1% of
people with poliovirus experienced paralysis (Kunschner, 2008; Center for
Disease Control, 2015). Further, most paralytic polio patients in mid-century
America recovered sufficiently to live normal lives:
Even in the relatively rare group of paralytic cases, 50 to 75 per cent of
those afflicted recover completely without any treatment at all. An
additional 10 to 20 per cent make fairly satisfactory recoveries. This leaves
only a small fraction of patients who sustain grave aftereffects. (Sulkin,
1946, p. 384)
Notably, of those who contracted paralytic polio, 5% died from the disease
(Kunschner, 2008).
Regardless of the rates of mortality or morbidity, polio epidemics were
particularly frightening. The first recorded polio epidemic in the United States
was in Vermont in 1843, and while there were brief lulls during the winter and
some years, as the nineteenth century became the twentieth century, polio only
struck more fiercely (Smithsonian Behring Center, 2016).
Even as new technologies, like the iron lung and rocking bed, were
developed and lowered the case-to-death ratio, polio cases continued spreading
with little hope the medical community could stem the tide of disease without a
vaccine. In 1954, both Jonas Salk and Albert Sabin separately developed polio
vaccines: Salk created a vaccine with a killed poliovirus and Sabin created a live
polio vaccine where the poliovirus was weakened (Smithsonian Behring Center,
2016). These vaccines were not a foolproof panacea, though they were and
continue to be effective and were received eagerly by the populace (Smith, 1990).
The vaccines had effectiveness rates of 60% to 90% (Sirkin & Brenner, 1960);
while this vaccination rate is high enough to create herd immunity, it does not
guarantee immunity when only certain individuals in the population are
vaccinated as was the case in the early years of the vaccine. In 1957, variation in
vaccine penetration was high as evidenced by differences between Census
regions: 10.1% of 5- to 9-year-olds in New England were not inoculated, while
22.7% of children in the same age group were not inoculated in the West South
Central region. The case for universal vaccination was not helped by early vaccine
failures. The most horrific example occurred with Cutter Manufacturing in
California, which in 1955 did not perform Sabin’s procedure for deactivating the
polio vaccine properly. Tragedy ensued; the Cutter incident “caused 40 000 cases
of polio, leaving 200 children with varying degrees of paralysis and killing 10”
(Fitzpatrick, 2006).
In fact, in 1957, polio eradication in the United States was far from certain
and polio remained a real fear for many parents. A 1957 Atlantic article even
hinted the true reliability of the Salk polio vaccine remained undetermined:
The evidence that the presently available polio vaccine does not decrease the
number of carriers, and the clear-cut vaccine failures, make it apparent that
5

polio will not be eradicated by this means. Unless the Salk vaccine can be
improved, other kinds of vaccine must be developed. (Rustein, 1957)
Polio & Uncertainty
Polio’s impact on society concerned not only health outcomes but also behaviors
and beliefs. How sensitive were mid-century parents to polio threats? Rustein
(1957) notes that
Polio has its peak occurrence each summer, when parents anxiously note
the location of each new case. In the past they have stood by helplessly
when the disease struck nearby, watching through the passing months to
learn whether this was a "polio year" in their town or state and breathing
easily only when cold weather came. (Rustein, 1957)
Rustein’s reference to a “polio year” illustrates that it was understood how noisy
polio incidence rates could be in the same state over different years. In Figure 1, I
present average weekly polio incidence rates for four states to demonstrate how
spikes in polio incidence rates functioned as exogenous shocks.
Parental concern over the location of polio infection is central to the
identification strategy, as awareness and conditional exogeneity of polio
incidence rates are necessary for causal inference. Evidence points to both
parents and communities being highly sensitive to polio outbreak location. Entire
communities would place themselves under quarantine in the wake of a polio
outbreak:
In 1930 an outbreak centered in Middletown, Connecticut, caused
Wesleyan University to cancel its football season and prompted 141
students to quit school. That same fall, local health officials closed schools
in Topeka, Kansas, and banned public meetings in Los Angeles, California.
… [In the summer of 1931] Los Angeles witnessed an epidemic so severe
the city health services began to break down. Ambulances and stretchers
blocked the streets in front of Los Angeles County Hospital, where patients
were turned away by frightened hospital employees. In 1935 Boston was
hit, the entire city of Annapolis, Maryland, was quarantined, and President
Roosevelt, himself a polio victim, called off a national Boy Scout Jamboree
in Virginia. In 1936 churches and resorts in Alabama were closed, Chicago
was swept by a large epidemic, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, shut down tight.
(Smith, 1990, p. 39)
The rare but severe outcome that everyone feared and that caused these
disruptions was paralytic polio. Paralytic polio patients were placed behind glass
and quarantined – they wrote messages to visitors on chalkboards. If a patient
was paralyzed so they could no longer swallow on their own, two respiration
tubes were installed: one for feeding and one to syphon fluid out of the lungs. If a
patient was paralyzed so they could no longer breathe on their own, they were
placed inside the notorious iron lung (Smith, 1990).
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Figure 1. Average Weekly Polio Incidence Rates for One State in Each Census
Region.
As previously noted, most paralytic polio patients recovered sufficiently to
live normal daily lives. However, those patients who did not recover became
emblematic of the horror polio could wreak:
In 1939 a woman gave birth while in an iron lung; by that time, it had been
proven that you could survive in an iron lung for ten years. (Smith, 1990,
p. 39)
Parents were afraid of an event with a low likelihood but that rare event was
terrifying and strongly motivating toward any behavioral change that might
lessen its likelihood.
Previous Literature on Avoidance Behavior
A large literature examines the behavioral changes and direct costs caused by
public health threats, including the impact of threats on educational outcomes in
historical contexts. However, much of this literature on health threats focuses on
the direct effect of the threat, referred to as the “cost of illness” in the health
economics literature. Cost of illness includes the impact of having an illness on
educational outcomes, rather than the anxiety the disease creates and this
7

anxiety’s impact on educational outcomes. Bleakley (2007) examines the impact
of hookworm, an intestinal parasite that causes fatigue but has a relatively low
publicity profile and low mortality. The large-scale public initiative in the early
twentieth century to treat hookworm and raise awareness of preventative
measures resulted in significant gains in school attendance, quality of education,
and eventual wages for those most likely to be infected with hookworm in the
southern United States.
While much of the health economics literature focuses on this and related
costs of illness, there is a growing literature concerned with the costs of avoidance
behavior in both current and historical contexts. Meyers and Thomasson (2017)
in particular examine the impact of the 1916 polio outbreak and its associated
school closings (a common form of communal avoidance behavior) on
educational attainment measured later-in-life for school-aged individuals who
would have been able to opt into the labor force but were not likely to become
infected with poliovirus. They find that higher levels of polio mortality (a proxy
for the likelihood of education disruptions) in a state resulted in lower later-inlife education attainment; a one standard deviation in polio case counts per
10,000 resulted in 0.07 fewer years of schooling, on average.
Much of the research examining avoidance behavior in contemporary
contexts examines such behavior at the macro-level. Avoidance behavior in
response to infectious disease outbreaks impacts tourism and trade the most
severely. The outbreak of Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Asia in
2003 caused significant declines in GDP in China and reductions in tourism for
all of the impacted countries (Hanna & Huang, 2004; Hai et al, 2004). Further,
an outbreak of the plague in Surat, India in 1994 resulted in a loss of $2 billion in
predicted trade (Cash & Narasimhan, 2000). Some of these macroeconomic
impacts are due to the aggregation of individual decisions (for example,
individuals deciding not to travel or purchase goods from infected countries) and
some are the result of government’s decision (Cash & Narasimhan (2000) note
that Bangladesh cut off trade with India prior to the official confirmation of a
single case of plague). I seek to add to the growing literature on micro-level
avoidance behavior by examining the impact of polio on kindergarten enrollment.

Analyses
When I consider the individual impact of polio on kindergarten enrollment, I
model the decision as a variable that takes the discrete form Ki =0 if a child who is
kindergarten-age (5- or 6-years-old) has not attended kindergarten in the time
period designated by the Census4 and Ki =1 if a kindergarten-age child has
attended kindergarten.5 I model this decision using the following equation:
'
Prob(Ki =1)=F ( α0 + α1 δst +βωst +ρμst +λi ϕ+σs +φt +εi )
4
5

Two months prior to February 1 in 1950 and 1960, one month prior to March 1 in 1940.
I take this “attendance” variable to signify enrollment, following Bleakley (2007).
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I include fixed effects for time, φt, and state, σs, to control for state-specific and
year-specific effects. I include state fixed effects to control for time-invariant state
characteristics (for example, climate, because polio is a disease with a high level
of seasonality6, and overall commitment to education). I include year fixed effects
to control for place-invariant year characteristics: kindergarten enrollment rates
rose between the beginning and end of the examined timespan, and polio
outbreaks varied each year, both as new generations became susceptible and as
new vaccines became available. These fixed effects will also control for any statespecific and year-specific heterogeneity in reporting polio case counts. Further, I
cluster standard errors at the state-level to account for the likelihood individuals
rising within a state may have correlated error terms across years.
The coefficient of interest is α1 , which reflects the impact of reported polio
incidence rates in state s in year t on the probability a child will be enrolled in
kindergarten. Further, I include personal and family characteristics in the vector
'
'
λi ϕ in the second and third specifications. In the secondary specification, λi ϕ is a
vector of a child’s demographic characteristics: age, race, and gender, which are
typical to include when examining the impact of exogenous shocks on school
attendance (Goodman, 2014; Currie et al, 2009; Fagernäs, 2015). In the third
specification, I also include covariates controlling for household head
characteristics and family characteristics: the occupational score of the head, if
the head is female, if the head is employed in agriculture, if both parents are
foreign, if the mother is present in the household, if the father is present in the
household, the number of siblings, and if the household is in a rural area. This
last set of covariates is based on those included by Fagernäs (2015).7
Because head of household education data is largely unavailable for 1950, I
include the median school years of residents 25 or older in a state s in year t as a
proxy in vector 𝜇𝑠𝑡 . Sample statistics for demographic, head of household, and
family characteristics, as well as average weekly polio incidence rates and stateyear variables, are shown in Table 1 for each Census year. These head of
household characteristics are included because female heads of households may
have differing preferences for children’s education, domestic and foreign parents
may differ in education preferences, preferences may vary over occupation, since
parents who work in agriculture are more likely to employ their children in labor,
and preferences may vary over income. Here income is captured by head
occupation score, a variable created by IPUMS to represent “occupational
economic standing” (Ruggles et al, 2017).8 In addition, I include family
characteristics because kindergarten availability may be lower in rural areas and
family income is likely to be correlated with education uptake.

“Seasonality” refers to the fact polio outbreaks were much more common in months with high
temperatures than months with low temperatures.
7 Note that unlike Fagernäs (2015), I do not include a household head’s literacy in these analyses
because this data is unavailable in the Census years I examine.
8 Occupational Income Score is the only income measure available for all three Census years I
examine.
6

9

Table 1. Summary Statistics by Census Year.
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
Female
Age
White
Black
Other Race
Occupational Score of Head
Female Head
Head Employed in Agriculture
Both Parents Foreign
Father Present in Household
Mother Present in Household
Number of Siblings
Rural
Median Years of Schooling (State-Year)
Birth Rate (State-Year)
Percent of Homes with Running Water (State-Year)
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1940
0.11
0.49
5.49
0.87
0.13
0.01
21.37
0.06
0.25
0.09
0.91
0.96
2.73
0.56
8.08
18.43
64.78

1950
0.63
0.48
5.50
0.89
0.11
0.00
23.82
0.06
0.16
0.05
0.90
0.96
2.14
0.47
9.44
23.82
82.78

1960
0.17
0.49
5.49
0.87
0.12
0.01
23.79
0.07
0.15
0.06
0.91
0.96
2.49
0.43
9.37
21.09
80.16

I identify the impact of polio on kindergarten enrollment by relying on
variation in reported state-level polio incidence rates. Because of this, I include
epidemiological factors that influence polio outbreaks in all analyses (the percent
of the population with running water and the crude birth rate in each state-year)
with vector 𝜔𝑠𝑡 . I account for the previously mentioned “hygiene hypothesis”
(that polio epidemics were caused by increases in sanitation) by including
percent of dwellings in a state-year with access to running water as a proxy for
varying sanitation levels. This is an especially important control if both sanitation
and public school kindergarten availability are impacted by a state’s overall
commitment to public good provision. If this is the case, the coefficient of interest
would be biased upward, with some states having both a higher likelihood of
kindergarten enrollment and more polio outbreaks.
A second hypothesis about polio’s rise is that shifting demography drove
increases in polio. Martinez-Bakker and Rohani (2015) identify the baby boom as
a driver of polio epidemics: rising birth rates created more asymptomatic polio
carriers in the form of six-month-old and younger infants who then spread polio
to other portions of the population. To control for this possibility, I include birth
rates by state of residence for the year t in all analyses. I also include birth rates
for t-5 and t-6 because these lagged birth rates are likely correlated with both
birth rates in year t and kindergarten enrollment for five- and six-year-olds in t.
When I examine if impacts are heterogeneous by age, I include lagged birth rates
appropriate for each age group (including the birth rate for t-7 when examining
seven-year-olds, for example).
I run several individual-level analyses to examine the impacts of reported
polio incidence rates on the likelihood a five- or six-year-old will be enrolled in
school.
These analyses include (1) an ordinary least squares regression including
all kindergarten-aged children, (2) a base logistic regression including all
kindergarten-aged children, (3) a probabilistic regression with all kindergartenaged children, (4) an OLS regression comparing kindergarten-aged children with
older but proximate age groups, and (5) an OLS regression comparing families
with a stay-at-home mother and families with two employed parents. I also
present a falsification test and robustness checks where (1) missing state-weeks
of polio data are included, (2) the effect of one-year polio leads on kindergarten
enrollment is the coefficient of interest, and (3) a less flexible model is used with
fixed effects excluded and replaced with state-year characteristics.

Data
To explore the impacts of the uncertainty surrounding polio, I obtained reported
state-week disease incidence rates from Project Tycho (van Panhuis et al., 2013).
Incidence rates are a measure of new disease case counts during a specified
timeframe and in the Tycho data take the form:
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Incidence Rate per 100,000 in Week W=
Number of New Polio Cases in Week W
Estimated Population in 100,000 in Week W
Using weekly disease incidence rates data, I create an average weekly
incidence rate for a given twelve month period. I use the average weekly
incidence rate instead of total incidence rate for the given time period because
average weekly incidence rate will be less impacted by missing observations
within the Tycho data than an aggregated incidence rate. However, average
weekly incidence rates are an imperfect measure of either the stock or the flow of
population-adjusted polio cases, and instead attempt to capture the average rate
of appearance of new cases in the reference period. A parent’s decision to enroll
their child in school in the wake of a polio outbreak is likely driven by how
prevalent the disease appears to be, and this formed belief about prevalence
might intensify (or lessen) over time if average disease incidence rates rose (or
fell). Average weekly incidence rates then are appropriate to use because they
give a sense of how prevalent the disease was over a period of time and on
average how many new cases a parent was made aware of throughout the period.
I also include base results using two different measures of polio incidence
(estimated total yearly incidence rates in state s, the maximum weekly incidence
rate in the past twelve months in state s, and the minimum weekly incidence rate
in the past twelve months in state s) in Table 26 in Appendix A.
The reference point for the individual-level data is the Census reference
date for the individual enrollment question: February 1 for 1950 and 1960 and
March 1 for 1940. Because of this, the average polio incidence rate for the
analyses is not for the calendar year but the average incidence rate from the
February of year t-1 through the January of year t for 1950 and 1960, and the
average incidence rate from the March of year t-1 to the February of year t for
1940. The historic polio data that Project Tycho has digitized contains missing
observations; I only include observations that have at least three-quarters of a
year’s data (ie, data that is missing 13 state-week observations or fewer) on
incidence rates in order to have a more accurate measure of the average incidence
rate of polio. In Table 27 in Appendix A, I present results with varying thresholds
for the number of missing state-weeks. There is an apparent tradeoff between
observations gained and the model’s ability to fit the data (indicated by the RSquared) when observations in state-years with less data are included in the
analysis. Nevertheless, results broadly agree with the results that follow.
I obtained individual-level micro-data for the Census from the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA) website (Ruggles et al., 2017). Headsof-household are coded as being employed in agriculture if they are “farm, ranch,
and other agricultural managers,” farmers or ranchers, farm laborers (including
farm foremen, farm wage workers, unpaid family workers, or self-service farm
laborers), or farm owners or tenants. I code respondents as living in a rural area
if they live outside a metro area. I inflation adjust all dollar amounts used to 1960
dollars.
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I obtained the percent of reporting homes without running water for the
decennial Housing Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1943; U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1953; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1963). Crude birth rates were taken
from the Center for Disease Control’s Vital Statistics of the United States (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1946, 1962b). Crude birth rate by state of residence is used
for 1935 and later years; crude birth rate by state of occurrence is used for years
prior to 1935 because crude birth rate by state of occurrence is unavailable for
these years. Median years of schooling were obtained from Census records made
available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
(Haines et al, 2010; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1942; U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1952; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962a). In the 1940 Census median years of
schooling were calculated separately for men and women; I use the median years
of schooling for men in the analyses, but the two are closely related (ρ=0.92).

Results
Main Results
I focus on the question of how an increase in the incidence rate of polio impacted
the likelihood a kindergarten-aged child would be enrolled in kindergarten. I
report results for all logistic and probabilistic regressions in terms of average
marginal effects. I report results for the OLS regression in Table 2, and I report
results for the logistic regression in Table 3, and for the probit in Appendix A,
Table 28. For all regressions, I present three analyses: an analysis with controls
for polio case counts per capita, birth rates, running water controls, and state and
year fixed effects; an analysis that adds demographic controls (age, gender, race);
and an analysis that further controls for household and family characteristics and
median schooling of adults in a state-year.
In the base analysis, shown in column (1), I observe a new case of in polio
in the average week per 100,000 people results in a 3 to 4 percentage point
reduction in the likelihood a child will attend kindergarten but this result borders
on insignificance, especially once a rich panel of covariates is added. The size of
this coefficient is comparable to the magnitude of having a female head of
household in absolute terms, or approximately half of the size of the impact of
living in a rural area where there might be lower kindergarten availability overall.
The main analysis with all coefficients, outside of state and year fixed
effects are reported in Appendix A, Table 29. I report OLS as the main analysis
because the logistic regression, while it may be better suited to binary outcomes,
may suffer from the incidental parameters problem because of the large number
of fixed effects in the model.
Logistic regressions are what has been traditionally used within the school
enrollment literature. I therefore present these results as well in Table 3. These
results imply that a 1.0 increase in the average polio incidence lowers the
likelihood a child would attend kindergarten by 4.6 percentage points in column
(3). To compare the magnitude of this result to that of other variables, the
13

Table 2. Pooled OLS Regression of the Impact of Polio Incidence Rate on the
Likelihood of Kindergarten Attendance for Five- and Six-Year-Olds.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.041
-0.041*
-0.035
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
2
R
0.14
0.34
0.35
N
95,839
95,839
95,839
State & Year Fixed Effects
x
x
x
Epidemiological Controls
x
x
x
Demographic Characteristics
x
x
Head of Household & Family
x
Characteristics
Median Years of School Control
x
Family Characteristics
x
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3. Pooled Logistic Regression of the Impact of Polio Incidence Rate on the
Likelihood of Kindergarten Attendance for Five- and Six-Year-Olds.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.062**
-0.051**
-0.046**
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Log Pseudolikelihood
-5,435,139.15 -4,335,417.08 -4,267,705.38
N
95,839
95,839
95,839
State & Year Fixed Effects
x
x
x
Epidemiological Controls
x
x
x
Demographic Characteristics
x
x
Head of Household & Family
x
Characteristics
Median Years of School
x
Control
Family Characteristics
x
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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average marginal effect of a child living in a rural area is a 7.5 percentage point
reduction in the likelihood that child would attend kindergarten, all else equal,
and the average marginal effect of a child with a head of household employed in
agriculture results in a 4.0 percentage point reduction. Thus, the impact of a
polio outbreak during the year can be a large impact, comparable to a reduction
in the availability of kindergarten or the willingness of a parent to lose an
additional farmhand.
Heterogeneous Effects by Age
If the non-mandatory nature of kindergarten is what is driving the results
because parents have greater ability to change their behaviors for this particular
age group, then other proximately aged children whose schooling is mandatory
should show a different pattern of results. Table 4 reports results when looking at
different age bands close to five- and six-year-olds: seven- and eight-year-olds
and nine- and ten-year-olds. For the other age bands, I find consistently
insignificant results. This could indicate polio was a disease of particular concern
to parents of young children, and parents were particularly responsive when
schooling was not required.
I take these results to point to the idea that parents with additional
flexibility because a child was younger (and therefore less likely to be subject to a
state’s compulsory education law) were more likely to keep the child out of
school. Another margin that might indicate additional flexibility to keep a child
home from school in the wake of a polio outbreak is the presence of a stay-athome mother in the family, which I examine in the next section.
Heterogeneous Effects by Maternal Employment
In addition to the age of a child granting parents additional discretion over school
enrollment decisions, parental employment may also impact the decision to
enroll or not enroll a child in school. To examine this possibility, I analyze the
enrollment patterns of two different types of family employment structures:
families with a stay-at-home mother who has not had another occupation in at
least the last year and families with dual incomes. Focusing on these long-term
stay-at-home mothers removes the possibility a working mother quit her job to
stay at home with her children because of a polio outbreak. Instead, the implied
channel is that some families have more flexibility about school enrollment
decisions than others because of the previous presence of a homemaker.
Results shown in Table 5 imply that the impact of polio incidence varies by
maternal employment: coefficients for families with long-term homemakers
consistently have larger impacts and greater precision than families with two
employed parents; the families with an available homemaker seem to be the
families driving the analysis. Results imply that one additional case of polio in the
average week out of 100,000 people decreased the likelihood a child would be
enrolled in kindergarten by more than 4.5 percentage points if that child was in a
family with a stay-at-home mother. An additional way to view these results is that
15

Table 4. OLS Regression of the Impact of Polio Incidence Rates on the Likelihood
of School Enrollment for Seven- and Eight-Year-Olds, and Nine- and Ten-YearOlds.
7 & 8 Year Olds
(1)
(2)
(3)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
0.008
0.008
0.004
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
2
R
0.06
0.06
0.06
N
92,839
92,839
92,839
9 & 10 Year Olds
(4)
(5)
(6)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.013
-0.012
-0.014
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
2
R
0.05
0.05
0.05
N
90,217
90,217
90,217
State & Year Fixed Effects
x
x
x
Epidemiological Controls
x
x
x
Demographic Characteristics
x
x
Head of Household & Family Characteristics

x

Median Years of School Control
Family Characteristics
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

x
x
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Table 5. Pooled OLS Regression of the Impact of Polio Incidence Rates on the
Likelihood of Kindergarten Attendance for Five- and Six-Year-Olds, with
Separate Analysis for Families with Long-Term Homemakers, and Families with
Two Working Parents.
Mother Not in the Labor Force
(1)
(2)
(3)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.060**
-0.053**
-0.046**
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
2
R
0.13
0.36
0.37
N
61,518
61,518
61,518
Both Parents in Labor Force
(4)
(5)
(6)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.014
-0.038
-0.027
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
2
R
0.14
0.32
0.33
N
10,086
10,086
10,086
State & Year Fixed Effects
x
x
x
Epidemiological Controls
x
x
x
Demographic Characteristics
x
x
Head of Household & Family
x
Characteristics
Median Years of School Control
x
Family Characteristics
x
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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if the polio incidence rate increased by one standard deviation (.24 for the
sample), the likelihood a child with a stay-at-home mother would be enrolled in
kindergarten would drop by 1.08 percentage points. These results bolster the
argument that that the impact of polio incidence is driven by parental discretion
when faced with a health threat: parents with additional flexibility to keep a child
at home, either because of a child’s age or because there is a person available to
take care of the child, are more likely to display behavioral changes in response to
polio outbreaks.
Falsification Tests & Robustness Checks
To ensure that results are caused by exogenous shocks to public health
uncertainty driven by polio outbreaks and not other mechanisms, I present
results in Table 6 where I use one-year leading polio incidence rates instead of
current year polio incidence rates. The results are insignificant with smaller
coefficients than the main results. I take these findings to indicate that polio case
counts are exogenous with respect to kindergarten enrollment once state-level
covariates are included in the analyses. Presented in Table 7 are analyses that
control for the number of missing weeks in each state-year. A possible
relationship between state data quality and kindergarten availability could exist if
states with better infrastructure both provide more kindergarten and more
reliably report polio cases. Results do not indicate data quality is what drives the
results: the number of missing weeks are not significant predictors of
kindergarten enrollment, and controlling for the number of missing weeks results
in similar coefficients as the main analyses.
In addition to these robustness checks, within Appendix A I present
analyses without epidemiological controls (Table 30) and without state fixed
effects (Table 31), respectively. Results are more significant when epidemiological
controls are excluded. and are insignificant and positive when state fixed effects
are excluded.

Conclusion
These analyses indicate polio could have had large impacts on families with the
greatest ability to change their behavior – families with children whose schooling
was optional and with a person already at home to stay with a child. If this is the
case, what explains the increased uncertainty and fear surrounding poliomyelitis?
First, polio’s mode of transmission is the oral-fecal route. This
differentiates it from other childhood diseases like measles, mumps, or pertussis,
which are spread through cough. These diseases’ modes of transmission are also
their major symptom. Because there is a difference between polio’s mode of
transmission and its symptoms, parents cannot readily observe who is infected
(or contagious) in a child’s class or community or even the infection status of
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Table 6. Falsification Test: Pooled OLS Regression of Impact of One Year Leading
Polio Incidence Rates on Kindergarten Enrollment.
(1)
(2)
(3)
One Year Leading Polio Incidence
-0.041
-0.030
-0.027
Per 100,000
(0.047)
(0.048)
(0.043)
2
0.14
0.34
0.35
R
95,369
95,369
95,369
N
x
x
State & Year Fixed Effects
x
x
Epidemiological Controls
x
Demographic Characteristics
Head of Household & Family
Characteristics
Median Years of School Control
Family Characteristics
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

x
x
x
x
x
x

Table 7. Robustness Check: Pooled OLS Regression of Impact of Polio Incidence
Rates on Kindergarten Enrollment with Number of Missing Weeks of Polio
Observations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.041
-0.042*
-0.035
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
(0.025)
(0.023)
(0.021)
0.000
0.001
0.000
Missing Weeks Included
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
2
0.14
0.34
0.35
R
95,839
95,839
95,839
N
x
x
x
State & Year Fixed Effects
x
x
x
Epidemiological Controls
x
x
Demographic Characteristics
Head of Household & Family
x
Characteristics
x
Median Years of School Control
x
Family Characteristics
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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their own child. A parental reaction to keep a child out of school makes sense
when thinking of ways individuals choose to delineate boundaries even when
such boundaries may not be statistically useful:
[A disease’s] crossing of boundaries is essential to the creation of panic.
When the edge of safety cannot be defined, people react in ways that are
not necessarily rational—cordoning off suspect populations; creating
artificial boundaries that create the illusion of safety; fleeing somewhere,
anywhere. (Humphreys, 2002)
Second, as discussed in the above section, polio is a relatively recent disease. This
newness may have made polio more threatening: mid-century parents witnessed
polio outbreaks growing more frequent and on a larger scale throughout their
lifetimes until the introduction of the polio vaccines. Third, polio may have been
especially frightening because of the associated paralysis and the fact that polio
primarily attacks children, possibly handicapping or scarring them for life
(Dredge, 2008). Perhaps as a result, polio became the focus of a massive media
campaign for eradication in the 1900’s:
… in 1938 [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt helped found the National
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (known later as the March of Dimes)
that raised millions of dollars for the rehabilitation of those who suffered
from paralytic polio and later invested heavily in funding the research that
led to effective polio vaccines. (Dredge, 2008, p. 552)
All of these reasons indicate that polio was much more in the public eye and
imagination than other childhood diseases. It is possible that the culmination of
this publicity and associated notoriety resulted in pronounced avoidance
behavior, especially among families where such avoidance behavior was less
costly. These results highlight the real impacts that uncertainty surrounding
public health can create, and that some populations will be most likely to exhibit
this behavior: populations both directly affected by the disease and populations
with flexibility to enact such behavior with lower costs.
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CHAPTER 2
DEBT PLUS: COULD STUDENT LOANS IMPACT PARENTS’
RETIREMENT?
Introduction
Student loans have come to the forefront of national attention in recent years,
and a burgeoning economic literature investigates loans’ impacts on borrowers’
outcomes. This emergence of literature and attention is not surprising: total
student loan debt (including Perkins, Stafford, PLUS,9 and nonfederal loans) has
remained above $100 billion in constant 2013 dollars since the 2007-2008
academic year. Inflation-adjusted debt per student rose by 35% from 2004 to
2013, and the number of borrowers increased 86% during the same timeframe
(Trends in Student Aid, 2014). These statistics take into account all student loans
taken out by both parents of students and students themselves, but the student
loan literature thus far has focused mainly on federal Stafford loans or the
means-tested Perkins loans and their effect on student borrowers. Little research,
economic or otherwise, has been dedicated to how student loan uptake impacts
parents. Parents may be directly impacted by taking out student loans to fund
their child’s education, or they may be indirectly impacted by supporting their
children through the loan repayment process. Student loans could then possibly
create intergenerational transfers of wealth that may be unplanned and may be
particularly risky as a parent approaches retirement age. This possibility opens
up economic questions: does student loan uptake delay parents’ retirement or
decrease their retirement savings? We examine this question by looking at
student loan presence within a household (which includes both debt taken out by
parents for students and debt taken out by any students that reside within the
household) on several measures of retirement behavior, expectations, and
savings.
PLUS loans, the most common loan parents take out, made up 12% of all
federal and nonfederal loan dollars in the 2016-2017 school year (Trends in
Student Aid, 2017). During this time frame the average PLUS loan recipient
borrowed 2.4 times more than the average federal Stafford loan recipient (Trends
in Student Aid, 2017). Figure 2 illustrates the percent of parents borrowing PLUS
loans and the average dollar amount borrowed from a sample of college students’
families interviewed by Sallie Mae. Despite the fact that PLUS loan use is
relatively common, little information is publicly available about the repayment,
default, and deference rates of PLUS loans, unlike federal loans disbursed to
students (Fishman, 2018).
In this paper, we examine the effect of student loan presence in the
household on parents’ employment status, retirement expectations, and
retirement preparation. Using a rich data set that links parents to children and
Stafford and Perkins loans are federal student loans made to students; PLUS loans are federal
student loans made to parents or graduate students.
9
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Figure 2. Percent of Families Borrowing PLUS Loans and the Amount of PLUS
Loans Borrowed Interviewed in Sallie Mae’s “How America Pays for College.”10
those children to their undergraduate institutions, we measure the effect of
student loans on parental labor force participation, employment status, expected
retirement age, the gap between the age a parent expects to retire and the age she
believes others at her same job retire, and dollars in a family’s individual
retirement accounts (IRAs). The main concern with a simple regression model to
calculate the effect of uptake on these variables is that parents in families where
student loans are present may differ from parents in families where student loans
are not present in a systematic way that affects outcomes of interest. We account
for the possibility of omitted variable bias in three ways: (1) we include a robust
set of control variables about the child’s institution and control variables
correlated with retirement behaviors, (2) we examine if taking out student loans
in the present period is correlated with money problems in a past period that
would not affect student loan eligibility, and (3) we compare our unconditional
results with results that include this robust set of controls and formally evaluate
the potential threat from unobservables using a technique developed by Oster
(2017).
The question of the relationship between student loan debt and retirement
is timely because not only has student loan debt in general come to the forefront
of national attention, but there is widespread concern that Baby Boomers retiring
will affect the economy at large (Casselman, 2014). Baby Boomers are also more
indebted than previous generations, and that indebtedness has led to less
financial security (Lusardi, Mitchell, & Oggero, 2017). This paper links these
10

(Sallie Mae, multiple years)
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topics in an attempt to shed light on the ramifications of student loan presence in
a household on parents.
The most striking results we find concern dollars in a household’s
Individual Retirement Accounts. The results indicate a significant reduction in
IRA dollars for borrowers: a household with any student loan debt on average
has $70,000 fewer dollars in IRAs than a household without student loans.
Moreover, results imply an additional $10,000 in student loan debt reduces IRA
savings by $14,000. Neither the presence nor amount of student loans affect the
likelihood a family will have an IRA. Results also indicate an additional $10,000
of student loan debt increases a parent’s expected retirement age by 5 months.
The presence of any student loan debt increases the likelihood a parent will be
employed by 5.5 percentage points and increases the likelihood a parent will be in
the labor force by 5.4 percentage points, but the employment status coefficients
are only marginally significant. Robustness checks and a formal check for
robustness developed by Emily Oster (2017) suggest that these results could be
driven by unobservable differences between families who borrow and families
that do not.

Background & Previous Literature
PLUS Background
Although we focus on the effect of all student debt within a household, PLUS loan
debt, the type of debt taken out directly by parents, and its mechanics may be less
familiar. To this end, this section briefly explains this particular type of debt.
PLUS loans are available to both parents and graduate students, but we focus on
the implications of PLUS loans for parents.
Like other federal student loans, PLUS loans are not collateralized debt
nor does an application require an income check. However, PLUS loans differ
from other federal loans in two main ways: (1) a PLUS loan requires a separate
application that includes a credit check and (2) the amount a PLUS loan recipient
can borrow is determined by an institution’s cost of attendance rather than a
dollar amount set by the federal government.
The credit check required for PLUS loan receipt is only a check for adverse
credit history, not a check to examine repayment ability. Moreover, the credit
check simply approves or denies a parent for access to the loan rather than for a
specific loan amount.
The loan amounts offered to approved PLUS recipients can be extremely
high because the loan covers the cost of attending a university less any other aid.
Cost of attendance is determined by a university itself, and can include indirect
expenses (such as travel) as well as direct expenses (such as tuition, room, and
board). PLUS loans thus offer parents an opportunity to fill the gap between the
aid their child has received (including any loans taken out by the child) and the
cost of attending a university. However, this opportunity also means that an
education may make families indebted over multiple generations, with a student
taking out the maximum amount of loans they can and then parents borrowing
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the rest (Fishman, 2018). Dependent students could only borrow $31,000 in
Stafford loans in their total college career in 2016; no aggregate limit existed for
PLUS loans. Further, the interest rates on PLUS loans are typically much higher
than Staffords: for the 2016-2017 school year, the interest rate on PLUS loans
was 7.00% and the interest rate on Stafford loans was 4.45%. Thus, PLUS loans
allow parents to borrow large levels of debt that compound faster than the loans
offered to students, with no attempt to estimate a parent’s repayment ability.
Previous Literature
Although student loans are frequently portrayed in the media as an unmitigated
burden, this debt conforms to economists’ lifecycle consumption hypothesis. The
lifecycle consumption hypothesis predicts individuals will acquire debt early in
life, pay the debt back by midlife, and begin saving for retirement. This
consumption-smoothing benefit of Stafford and Perkins student loans is believed
to outweigh their costs for most individuals (Webber, 2016). Regardless,
numerous studies have documented larger behavioral change than theoretically
predicted in the presence of student loan debt (Field, 2009; Minicozzi, 2004;
Rothstein & Rouse, 2010; Cooper & Wang, 2014).
On the other hand, parents do not anticipate any consumption-smoothing
properties due to student loan uptake. Anecdotally, it seems common for
students to promise to pay back the loans themselves even though the debt is in
their parent’s name (Rhode, 2015). At most, PLUS loans are then a second best
solution to Staffords or a supplement to Staffords.
Parental contributions (including PLUS loans and other forms of
borrowing, as well as funding education through income or assets) make up the
largest portion of student aid (Sallie Mae, 2015). There is a small amount of
literature on the interaction of parental aid and student aid or outcomes, but as
far as the authors are aware there is no literature on the effect of parental aid or
student loans on parents. Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2016) find that West
Virginia’s PROMISE merit aid scholarship decreased the amount of loans taken
out by parents by less than $1,000, but this result is statistically significant only
for some subpopulations (female students, non-Pell recipients, and public high
school students) and not significant for the total population. Stolper (2014) found
that parents with access to increased credit, specifically a Homeowner Equity
Line of Credit, are more likely to send their child to a more selective school and
push renters’ children out of these more selective schools. Further, children
whose parents are providing some source of their aid are more likely to stay in
school but also have lower GPAs than students whose parents are not
contributing financially (Hamilton, 2013).
Why would a parent borrowing for education produce different impacts on
retirement than parents funding education through their income or savings? We
posit the difference is planning. For large portions of borrowing families,
borrowing was unanticipated: 30% of borrowing families Sallie Mae (2015)
interviewed had not planned to borrow for college. This much unexpected debt
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late in life may distort parents’ labor market choices, especially when many older
Americans are uninformed about their own retirement preparedness.11
A small literature on later-in-life debt confirms this intuition. Anguelov
and Tamborini (2009) emphasize that deviating from the lifecycle consumption
path (either from an individual miscalculating their own trajectory or unplanned
life events) through accruing late-in-life debt may impact individuals in a variety
of ways:
Servicing high levels of debt while working may hinder a family’s ability to
save for retirement. … Debt service obligations could lead individuals to
work longer. Debt may also reduce the longevity of a household’s
accumulated financial assets and savings, which would have to be spent
down to repay debt when income is limited. Indebtedness, especially from
high-interest consumer borrowing, could also leave elderly persons with
fewer retirement resources in the face of health and other income shocks.
(p.14)
A working paper from the Center of Retirement Research at Boston College finds
support for this view. Butrica and Karamcheva (2013) examine the effect of
indebtedness and liquidity constraints on nondisabled older adults’ (those who
are aged 62 to 69) joint decisions of retirement and Social Security uptake
through a bivariate probit model. Butrica and Karamcheva look at overall debt,
mortgage debt, and credit card debt. They find all three debt measures increase
the likelihood an individual will be working and decrease the likelihood of Social
Security benefit uptake. Their results imply that having any debt makes an
individual 8 percentage points more likely to work, having mortgage debt makes
an individual 7 percentage points more likely to work, and having any credit card
debt makes an individual 4 percentage points more likely to work. Additionally,
they use instruments for mortgage debt to try and determine the effect of debt on
retirement and benefit uptake with better identification. Even when using
instruments, they find mortgage debt to be a significant predictor of employment.
Mann (2011) estimates the impact of debt on retirement decisions using a
multivariate model with individual-level fixed effects. The results confirm
intuition: individuals with higher debt levels delay retirement longer. She finds
this impact is lessened for those with higher wealth levels.

Economic Model & Methodology
To examine the specific effect of student loan debt, we adapt a simple economic
model employed by Butrica and Karamcheva (2013). The model relates liquidity
constraints to retirement decisions and includes controls for demographic and
economic characteristics. Butrica and Karamcheva use a bivariate probit to model
the effect of household debt on labor force participation and Social Security
Munnel et al (2017) estimate that 52% of U.S. households in the 2013 Survey of Consumer
Finances are underprepared financially for retirement, and 19% of U.S. households believe they
are prepared for retirement and are not.
11
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uptake as a joint decision.12 We instead solely examine the effect of student loan
debt on employment status, retirement savings, and retirement expectations
regressands separately. The model for individual i with children who attend
colleges with aggregate characteristics u is thus
Yi = Xi β+Lci γ+Ku ρ
Here, Yi is a parental outcome of interest: employment status (employed,
unemployed, not in the labor force, or retired), expected retirement age, distance
from parent’s own expected retirement age and the age they believe others with
their same job retire at, presence of IRA/annuity savings within the household, or
dollars in an IRA/annuity for the entire household. For the employment status
variables and presence of an IRA account, Yi is the realized outcome of a latent
*
variable Y*i where Yi =1[Yi >0] . For the other continuous variables, Yi itself is the
outcome of interest. Following Butrica and Karamcheva (2013), Xi is a vector of
economic and demographic data about person i. Lci contains information about a
household’s liquidity constraints, specifically a household’s student loan debt. We
include aggregate measures of a parent’s children’s college exposure rather than
individual parent-child pairs because we do not want the analysis to be driven by
parents with multiple children when the effect we investigate is on the parent
rather than the child. We include number of children and total number of years a
child has gone to school, however, to account for the fact that some parents are
exposed to the choice about borrowing for a child’s education multiple times and
to account for the number of years a parent could be borrowing to fund.
We include these institutional characteristics because the literature on
student loan debt has also found that individuals who attend some school types
are more likely to have higher levels of debt. Private and for-profit schools are
associated with higher debt levels for students than public schools, and four year
colleges are associated with higher debt levels than two year colleges (Chen &
Wiederspan, 2015; Cellini & Darolia, 2016). Schools in the private and for-profit
sectors also tend to have higher average PLUS loan disbursements and a higher
percentage of students receiving parental PLUS loans (Dancy, 2016). In addition,
students at historical black colleges and universities (HBCUs) have been found to
be take out more loans than students at non-HBCU schools (Hackett, 2016). For
these reasons, we include 𝐾𝑢 , a vector of data about the colleges that parent i’s
children attended: number of children that attended college a parent was
matched with, the latest child’s first entrance year, the total number of years of
college a parent’s children have attended, and categorical variables for the
percent of a parent’s children (“all,” “some,” or “none”) that began college at a
private school, public school, for-profit school, 4-year school, and historical black
college.13 We include the latest child’s first entrance year because it is likely that
Only 29% of our sample is eligible for social security (age ≥ 62) compared to all of Butrica &
Karemcheva’s sample.
13 We use categorical variables for these percentages rather than the percentages themselves
because data from the restricted data set we use is only allowed to be reported if cells have more
than 11 observations. The categorical variables meet this standard; the percentages themselves
have too few observations per cell.
12
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when a child first attends college is when a parent makes the decision to fund the
child’s education with loans or not.
We perform a simple OLS analysis using cross sections of the latest data
available for a parent from the Panel Study of Income Dyanmics. The key threat
to identification in this case is omitted variable bias: parents in households with
student loans could differ systematically from parents in households without. In
order for the coefficient of interest to be unbiased and consistent, we require the
systematic part of the outcome variable Yi to be uncorrelated with the
unsystematic part of the outcome variable. In practice, this means that if the
underlying process generating the outcome 𝑌𝑖 is
Yi = Xi β+Lci γ++Ku ρ+Fi ϑ
where there is some omitted variable Fi for which E(Lci |Fi )≠0 then the zero
conditional mean assumption has been violated. If this happens, the coefficients
produced by OLS are inconsistent and biased. In other words, the results
produced may not capture the causal effect of loan presence on parents’ decisions
but spurious correlation between loan presence and retirement behaviors.
This possibility requires serious consideration about how to address it.
First, we include control variables for which we believe the conditions above will
hold. These controls include those considered by Butrica and Karamcheva
(2013): parental demographic characteristics (sex, age, if the respondent has
reached the age for Social Security uptake, and race and ethnicity), if a spouse is
present, reported health status, wealth and income information (the family
income excluding individual i’s labor income, and household assets) and state of
residence. We differ from Butrica and Karamcheva in three ways: (1) we use the
age of Social Security eligibility (62) rather than the Full Retirement Age for
Social Security (65) because our sample skews much younger, (2) we do not
include data on spousal income or retirement status because these fields are
collinear with spouse presence within the PSID data, and (3) we use state rather
than Census region because this more granular location data is available in the
PSID.
We include additional controls in the robustness checks: a measure of
financial literacy and the education of the parent’s mother in one robustness
check, and a measure of a household’s earliest wealth in another.14 We assume
that a parent’s maternal education is a proxy for a parent’s taste for education
and other unobservables that may drive labor market behaviors. A parent with a
higher taste for education may be more likely to fund their child’s education;
further, parental education has also been shown to have a significant effect on
labor market outcomes, perhaps because it represents unobservable traits with
value in the labor market (Agnarsson & Carlin, 2002; Hudson & Sessions, 2011).
Financial literacy has been shown to be positively related to retirement planning
behaviors and wealth accumulation (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007). Financial
These controls reduce the sample size further, so we include them as robustness checks and also
only include the employment status regressions; for the other regressions, sample size falls below
400.
14
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literacy may be correlated with PLUS loans in particular in two ways: (1) parents
with greater dedication to their child’s education, i.e. those who borrow education
loans, may prioritize their own education (including financial literacy), and (2)
financial literacy may matter especially for financial instruments parents are
unfamiliar with and instruments for which there is no income requirement and a
comparatively weak credit check, such as PLUS loans. If (1) holds, then the
coefficient of interest (the effect of student loan presence on retirement behavior)
would be biased downward. If (2) holds, the coefficient of interest would be
biased upward. In addition to these controls, we make use of a technique
developed by Emily Oster (2017).
Within the economics literature, coefficient stability is frequently taken as
a signal that a coefficient is robust and has approached its “true” unbiased value.
Oster (2017) points out that only considering coefficient stability and not R2
movements neglects to consider the possibility that the additional control a
coefficient is “robust” to may not be instrumental in explaining variation in the
model at all – and thus the coefficient of interest’s stability is not indicative of its
unbiasedness but of the small effect the additional control has on the model.
To propose formal tests of robustness, Oster (2017) relies on the simple
setup
Y= βX+Ψω0 +W2 +ε
Here, ω0 defines a vector of controls, W2 defines a vector of unobservables, and X
is the coefficient of interest (“treatment”). She also denotes Ψω0 = W1. Assume
W2 and W1 are orthogonal. For i = 1, 2, the variance of Wi and the cov(X, Wi ) are
denoted σ2i and σiX , respectively. Oster proposes a “coefficient of proportionality,”
δ, such that
σ
σ
δ σ1X2 = σ2X
2 .
1

2

Oster shows that δ can be interpreted as the degree of selection based on
unobservables necessary within an estimation for the effect of treatment (here,
the effect of student loan debt) to be explained away. The δ parameter estimated
takes into account not only coefficient stability but also R2 movements. This δ
provides an intuitive way to imagine selection bias if we assume a maximum15 R2
and β: δ = 3 implies that the selection process would need to rely three times
more on unobservable variables rather than observable variables for the
treatment effect, β, to equal zero. In addition, it is possible for δ to be negative,
but in this case implications about robustness are less clear. In these results, δ <
0 is associated with either (1) the coefficient of interest from the conditional
results is in fact further from zero than the coefficient of interest from the naïve
results (i.e., those that do not include control variables) or (2) the coefficient of
interest is insignificant. The literature surrounding the δ coefficient is still being
formed; we thus do not attempt to interpret any δ < 0 as indicating the presence
or absence of selection bias.
Oster points out the possible R2 for a given estimation is unlikely to be 1 “since in many settings
there is likely to be some idiosyncratic variation in outcome—and more importantly, the degree of
this is likely to vary…” (p. 5).
15
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From this, Oster derives a bias-adjusted β for which δ is assumed to be a
specific value (i.e., selection on unobservables and observables is assumed to be a
specific ratio). In the following analyses, we follow Oster’s suggestions and when
calculating δ, we assume β = 0, i.e. we estimate the degree of selection based on
unobservables necessary for the effect of student loan debt on parents to be
explained away entirely. When calculating the bias-adjusted β, we assume δ=1
(unobservables drive selection proportional to observables). For both
calculations, we must assume a maximum R2 (the amount of variation within the
data that can be explained). We follow Oster’s suggestion and assume R2max is 1.3
times the conditional R2. Oster suggests two formal standards for determining
the robustness of a coefficient of interest when the inclusion of controls moves β
further from 0, as happens in our analyses. These formal robustness tests are (1)
if δ is greater than 1, and (2) if the bias-adjusted β is within 2.8 standard errors of
the controlled β.16

Data
Panel Study of Income Dynamics
To perform the analyses, we use individual- and household-level data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal study of
families in the United States. The PSID began collecting survey data about these
families in 1968; originally 5,000 families were surveyed. The PSID surveyed
more than 9,000 families in 2015, a result of new populations being added to the
PSID (for example, a sample of 2,000 Latino households was added in 1990) and
also the formation of new families when children create their own households
(Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 2017). Surveys were given annually from 1968
to 1997 and once every two years from 1999 onward.
The PSID survey given to a family always consists of at least two portions:
the Main Family survey and the Individual survey. The PSID collects data about
members of a Family Unit who reside in the interviewed household. Each
member in the Family Unit is identified in relation to the household’s Head. The
household Head is identified as the main income earner in the household, unless
that main income earner is a female with a legal or cohabiting male partner, in
which case that male partner is considered the Head and the female partner is
considered the legal or cohabiting Spouse.17 These Family Units can and do
change over the course of the survey as people split off from the family and form
their own households.
Coverage (i.e., which family members questions are asked about) differs by
question, rather than by family, for both the Main Family and Individual survey.
Within the Main Family survey, data is collected for the entire Family Unit (for
example, the amount of IRA/annuity assets in total for all members of the Family
“+/− 2.8 standard errors is the bounds of the 99.5% confidence interval…” (Oster, 2017).
See the Panel Study of Income Dynamics’ Frequently Asked Questions (2018) for more
information about the selection process.
16
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Unit) or only for the household Head and the Head’s Spouse (for example, the
labor income for the Head two years ago, and the labor income for the Spouse
two years ago). The Individual survey collects information about all members of
the Family Unit (for example, an individual’s relationship to the Head) or only
about the individual answering the survey questions as well as the designated
Head and Spouse (for example, an individual’s reported health status).
In addition to these main questionnaires, families may also be given
supplemental questionnaires meant to explore specific topics. Of particular
relevance to this paper is the Transition to Adulthood (TA) supplement, a
rotating survey that began in 2005. Prior to 2017, the survey was given each year
to young adults (individuals between the ages of 18 and 28) who had previously
responded to the Child Development Supplement (CDS), a supplemental survey
about the resources (financial, time, and social-psychological) of children under
the age of 18. Beginning in 2017, the Transition to Adulthood survey was given to
all young adults in the PSID.
We detail the use and treatment of parent-child pairs, the coefficient of
interest (student loan debt), the outcome variables (labor market status,
retirement expectations, cash assets, and IRA assets), and important controls
(information on the postsecondary institutions a parent was exposed to) below.
The treatment of all other covariates is detailed in Table 32 in Appendix B.
In order to create aggregate measures of institutional exposure (for
example, the percent of a parent’s children whose first college entrance was at a
historical Black college), we first link each child to each parent. We only include
observations for which a parent-child pairing can be identified using the Main
Family survey. The Main Family survey identifies the mother and father of an
individual with unique individual identifiers if the mother and father also have
been in the PSID. These unique individual identifiers were then used to link other
information from the PSID about the parent or child to the parent-child pair.
Within the Main Family data, state of residence is collected each survey year. We
only include observations whose state of residence is known and within the
United States.
The education data the PSID collects is central to this study. Both the Main
Family survey and the Transition to Adulthood survey collect education
information, including dates of college entry (for the Transition to Adulthood
survey) and college exit (for the Transition to Adulthood and Main Family
survey). For our study, information on the year a child began attending college is
necessary because we assume the first year a child attends college is when a
parent makes the decision to fund their child’s education with parental loans or
not. We use college entry and exit dates from both the Main Family and
Transition to Adulthood surveys to maximize sample size,18 but the two surveys
ask different questions about college entry and exit dates, so the treatment of the

Individuals whose college entry or exit years are ascertained by one survey are not necessarily
ascertained by the other.
18
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data varies by which survey the data comes from. We outline these differences
below.
The Transition to Adulthood data explicitly asks for the entrance year for
both their recent and prior college program. Only students who have attended at
least two colleges list a prior college. We use the year a child began the earliest
observed college endeavor as their beginning year. This means that if a child has
both information on a prior college entrance year and a recent college entrance
year, we treat the prior college entrance year as the child’s beginning year.
To determine a child’s beginning year of postsecondary education from the
Main Family data, imputation is required. The Main Family data collects
information on the year a Head or Spouse last attended college, the highest year
of college completed (recorded as “completed one year,” “completed two years,”
up to “completed five or more years”), and their highest degree type. There are
two caveats to these data. The first caveat is that we are unable to include
information from the Main Family data for individuals whose highest degree type
is over a Bachelor’s because in that case the data available for the year that
individual last attended college refers to a degree higher than a Bachelor’s (for
which a parent could not have borrowed because parents are only eligible to
borrow for a dependent child’s education and graduate students are considered
independents).19 This means that for individuals with more than a Bachelor’s
degree, we cannot observe a college entrance year, so we do not include them.
The second caveat is that information is not collected about the child’s college
entrance year. Because of this, we impute a child’s beginning college year as the
year they last attended college minus the highest year of college completed.
Much of the rich data collected by the PSID is public but some individually
identifiable information is restricted and available only by application. For this
study, we use restricted PSID data that identifies a child’s undergraduate
institution. The restricted PSID contains the IPEDS Unit ID for the child’s
undergraduate institution within both the Transition to Adulthood and the Main
Family data. In the Transition to Adulthood data, we match a parent-child pair to
the college that the child’s college entrance year refers to (i.e., if a child’s college
entrance year refers to a prior college rather than a recent one, we match the
prior college’s IPEDS Unit ID to the parent-child pair). In the Main Family data,
identifying information is collected on the college that the Head or Spouse (who
here is a child of the parent we are interested in) received their highest degree
from. (We only include parent-child pairs where the child’s highest degree is a
Bachelor’s or less for reasons outlined in the above paragraph.) Unlike the
Transition to Adulthood data, we lack information about college changes, so for
the Main Family data we assume that the school a child’s Bachelor’s degree is
from is also the school where a child began their degree. If both Transition to
Adulthood and Main Family survey data on undergraduate institution is
available, we use the data that has the earliest corresponding beginning year.
This represents about 25% of college-educated of Heads and Spouses in any PSID Main Family
survey.
19
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We next detail our treatment of the dependent variables: individual
retirement accounts, labor force status, and retirement expectations. The PSID
collects information about household wealth, both with and without home equity,
as calculated by the sum of seven asset types less the sum of eight debt types. For
this paper, we are specifically interested in a family’s Individual Retirement
Accounts. Note the amount of dollars in IRAs are collected for the family as a
whole rather than for individuals.
Labor force status is collected for all individuals. Individuals can be
working now (employed), only temporarily laid off, looking for work
(unemployed), retired, permanently disabled, keeping house, a student, or other.
We only treat those who are looking for work as unemployed; we treat individuals
who are retired, permanently disabled, keeping house, or a student as not in the
labor force.
If a Head or Spouse has access to a pension or retirement plan at their
current job, questions about retirement were asked in the Main Family survey.
Respondents were asked at what age the Head or Spouse planned to stop
working, with both a continuous response (actual expected age) and a binary
response (“never”) accepted. Respondents were asked about the usual retirement
age of others who performed their job or that they worked with. Using this
information, we create a “retirement gap” variable representing the distance
between the individual’s expected retirement age and the perceived retirement
age of others. A positive retirement gap indicates the individual believes they will
retire after the average retirement age of others; a negative retirement gap
indicates the individual believes they will retire before the average retirement age
of others.
Finally, the treatment of the coefficient of interest, student loans, follows.
Within the Main Family survey, student loan debt information is collected for a
family as a whole. For this study, our main interest is the effect of student loan
presence in the household, thus distinguishing between loans taken out by
parents and those taken out by students is not our focus and would be difficult to
disentangle given the structure of the data available.
Summary statistics are listed below in Table 8. Statistics for dependent
variables are listed first, followed by student loan information, and then data for
other controls.
While the PSID collects information on many individuals, we end up with
772 observations in our main analysis. This is a result of several factors: (1) of the
27,709 parent-child pairs that the PSID identifies, only 7,640 parent-child pairs
have links to children with restricted data available on the child’s undergraduate
institution, (2) the sample drops from 7,640 parent-child pairs to 5,435 parents
once we collapse data to the parent level (2) only 3,510 of these parent-child pairs
have information available about student loan presence in the household, (3)
only 2,988 of these parent-child pairs have a college that can be matched to
information available from IPEDS, and (4) general loss of sample size once
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Table 8. Summary Statistics for Main Analyses.
Mean
Retire Gap
1.37
Usual Employment Status:
62.31
Retirement Age (Others)
Expected Employment Status:
65.04
Retirement Age (Self)
Never Expects to Retire
0.14
Employment Status: Retired
0.12
Employment Status: Not in the Labor
0.18
Force
Employment Status: Unemployed
0.03
Employment Status: Employed
0.81
Tens of Thousands of Real 2015
11.35
Dollars in IRA/Annuities
Whether Anyone in Family has
0.32
IRA/Annuities
Whether Anyone in Family has
0.18
Student Loans
Amount of Student Loans in Family in
0.51
Tens of Thousands of 2015 Dollars
Age
57.41
Social Security Eligibility
0.29
Spouse Present
0.69
Gender (Female = 1)
0.51
Black
0.29
Other Race
0.08
Hispanic
0.12
Health Status
2.56
Real Assets in Tens of Thousands of
49.62
2015 $s
Household Income Less Own Labor
Income in Tens of Thousands of 2015
5.07
$s
Real Assets Less Dollars in
IRA/Annuities in Tens of Thousands
38.26
of 2015 $s
Survey Reference Year: Employment
2014.97
Status
First entrance year of a parent's
2004.69
latest entering child
Number of Children Matched in
1.51
College
Total Years of College for All Children
4.56
33

Min
-32.00

Max
40.00

20.00

97.00

50.00

90.00

0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00

0.00

1.00

0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00

0.00

356.05

0.00

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

25.00

38.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

81.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
5.00

0.00

3573.50

0.00

79.03

0.00

3373.50

2011.00

2015.00

1987.00

2013.00

1.00

5.00

0.00

19.00

Table 8. Continued.
Financial Literacy (Scale = 0-6)
Earliest Wealth in Tens of Thousands
of 2015 $s
Mother's Education: 0-5 Grades
Mother's Education: 6-8 Grades
Mother's Education: 9-11 Grades
Mother's Education: High School
Graduate
Mother's Education: High School
Graduate + Some Nonacademic
Training
Mother's Education: Some College or
Associate’s Degree
Mother's Education: Bachelor’s
Degree
Mother's Education: Advanced
Degree
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Mean
4.76

Min
0.00

Max
6.00

14.08

-18.36

2059.11

0.01
0.12
0.14

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.46

0

1

0.04

0

1

0.11

0

1

0.10

0

1

0.03

0

1

controls are included because many individuals have missing information for at
least one control.
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
Data on institutions comes from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data
System (IPEDS). IPEDS contains data on a wide variety of college information,
including place, financing, and student makeup. For this study, we use data on a
college’s institutional control (public, private, or for profit); if the college is a
Historically Black College; and if the college is a two-year or four-year institution.
We merge this information onto the PSID data using the IPEDS Unit ID. Any
observation that cannot be matched with an institution through the IPEDS data
is dropped. We use dummy variables to represent the percent of a parent’s
children that have attended a certain type of college. For example, there are three
categories for the percent of a parent’s children that have attended a privately
owned college: “None,” “Some,” or “All.” Reducing the percentages to indicators
is necessary because of the small sample size and nature of the restricted PSID
data: no data with cell sizes smaller than 11 are allowed to be used in analyses.
Institutional characteristics for colleges that parent’s children attended are
shown below in Table 9.

Results
We present results both for the effect of the presence of student loan debt within
the family and the amount of student loan debt in the family in tens of thousands
of 2015 dollars. For the main results, we examine the effect of these student loan
debt variables on retirement expectations, employment status, and IRAs. In
addition, we address the possibility that families who borrow are significantly
different from families who do not borrow in three ways: (1) we present two
robustness checks with additional controls, one controlling for the earliest wealth
a family has and one controlling for the parent’s financial literacy and the
parent’s mother’s education, and (2) we look at the likelihood that current
student loan debt burden can successfully predict which families had money
problems in 1996, and (3) we report Oster’s δ statistic and bias-adjusted β to give
an idea of how much selection is due to unobservables.
For the robustness checks with additional controls, we present the effect
only on employment status because we lose further observations once we
introduce these controls and employment status has the most reliably large
sample size, however results for the other dependent variables follow the results
of the main analysis.
Table 10 shows the effect of having student loans within a family on a
parent’s retirement expectations. No retirement expectation variable is
significantly affected by student loan presence. We do not find a significant effect
on the likelihood a parent will never expect to retire, the age a parent expects to
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Table 9. College Institution Characteristics for Parent Sample.
Frequency
No Children Attended Historical Black
769
College or University
Some Children Attended Historical Black
17
College or University
All Children Attended Historical Black
34
College or University
No Children Attended Private Institution
611
Some Children Attended Private Institution
76
All Children Attended Private Institution
133
No Children Attended For-Profit Institution
759
Some Children Attended For-Profit
18
Institution
All Children Attended For-Profit Institution
43
No Children Attended Public Institution
179
Some Children Attended Public Institution
88
All Children Who Attended Public Institution
553
No Children Attended 4-Year or Higher
255
Institution
Some Children Attended 4-Year or Higher
70
Institution
All Children Attended 4-Year or Higher
495
Institution
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Percent
93.78
2.07
4.15
74.51
9.27
16.22
92.56
2.2
5.24
21.83
10.73
67.44
31.1
8.54
60.37

Table 10. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Retirement Expectations.
Others'
Usual
Age
Never
Retirement
Retirement
Expected to
Expects to
Gap
Age for
Retire (Self)
Retire
Same Job
Any Student Loans
-0.433
1.13
0.888
0.024
(0.81)
(0.78)
(0.58)
(0.04)
Bias-Adjusted β
-0.44
1.57
1.389
0.03
(δ=1)
Bias-Adjusted β
(δ=1) within 2.8
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Standard Errors of
Controlled β?
δ (β = 0)
10.86
-3.48
-1.88
-5.22
δ>1 ?
Yes
No
No
No
R2
0.27
0.31
0.37
0.18
N
401
418
691
761
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
retire, or the “retirement gap” (the distance between when a parent predicts they
will retire and when they believe others’ with their same job retire). In addition to
being insignificant, the direction of the coefficients does not tell a consistent
story: the coefficients for “never” expect to retire and retirement age are positive
(implying loans cause parents to expect to work longer) but the coefficient for the
retirement “gap” is negative (implying loans cause parents to retire earlier).
Turning to the employment status analysis shown in Table 11, results
indicate student loan debt presence shifts workers into the labor force and
particularly into employment, though both of these coefficients are significant
only at the 10% level. The likelihood of a parent being retired is not significantly
impacted by student loan debt presence. The likelihood of not being in the labor
force for any reason (retirement, student status, housemaker, or disabled) falls by
5.4 percentage points; and the likelihood of being employed increases 5.5
percentage points. The magnitude of the effect of student loan debt presence is in
line with effect of mortgage and credit card debt on retirement found by Butrica
& Karamcheva (2013). They found that the presence of credit card debt increased
the likelihood an individual would be working by 4.3 percentage points and the
presence of mortgage debt increased the likelihood an individual would be
working by 7.4 percentage points.
The 0.1 percentage point difference we find between the likelihood of being in the
labor force and being employed suggests the possibility that some of the
increased likelihood of employment may be due to a reduction in unemployment
as well, but the unemployment results do not display a significant
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Table 11. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Employment Status.
Not in Labor
Retired
Unemployed
Employed
Force
Any Student Loans
-0.035
-0.054*
-0.016
0.055*
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1)
0.00
-0.03
-0.02
0.03
Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1)
within 2.8 Standard
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Errors of Controlled
β?
δ (β = 0)
1.20
1.84
49.06
1.87
δ>1 ?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
2
R
0.37
0.3
0.14
0.3
N
771
771
771
771
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
effect and the R2 for unemployment is notably lower than the R2 for the other
employment status regressions. The degree of selection on observables for these
regressions all exceed the δ = 1.0 threshold, and the bias-adjusted treatment
coefficients are all within 2.8 standard errors of the treatment coefficient of the
original analyses.
Looking at the retirement savings results presented in Table 12, we do not
find an impact of the likelihood of having an IRA or annuities within the family,
but we find a very large effect on the amount of real 2015 dollars in an IRA or
annuity. Results imply that the presence of any student loans within a family
decreases the dollars in an IRA by a little more than $70,000 on average. The
average per borrower amount of parental PLUS loan in the 2016-2017 schoolyear was $15,878 (CollegeBoard, 2018), or approximately one-fourth of the
decrease in the IRA. If a parent took out this amount over a child’s four-year
college career, the amount of PLUS loan needing to be serviced would be smaller
than the dollars in IRA reduction estimated ($63,512 vs. $70,040). This result
also passes Oster’s standards for robustness.
Tables 13, 14, and 15 show the effect of the amount of student loan debt on
retirement expectations, employment status, and retirement savings,
respectively. We lose several observations that reported the student debt in a
household as a range (for example, less than $10,000 but more than $5,000)
rather than a number. The pattern of results differs from those found when
examining the presence of student loan debt. The results indicate an additional
$10,000 in student loan debt in a household increases the age a parent expects to
retire at by a little less than five months; note that this is only 7.7% of a standard
deviation of expected retirement age.20 Note however that the associated δ
20

The standard deviation for retirement age in the sample is 4.89 years (4 years and 11 months).
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Table 12. The Effect of Any Student Loan debt on Retirement Savings.
Dollars in IRA/Annuities
Whether Anyone in
(Tens of Thousands of
Family has
2015 $s)
IRA/Annuities
Any Student Loans
-7.004**
-0.074
(3.03)
(0.06)
Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1)
-6.33
-0.05
Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1)
within 2.8 Standard
Yes
Yes
Errors of Controlled β?
δ (β = 0)
7.21
2.57
δ>1 ?
Yes
Yes
2
R
0.37
0.35
N
767
767
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 13. The Effect of Amount of Student Loan Debt (In Tens of Thousands of
2015 $s) on Retirement Expectations.
Others' Usual
Age
Never
Retirement
Retirement Age Expected to
Expects to
Gap
for Same Job
Retire (Self)
Retire
Student Loans
(2015 $s, Tens of
-0.041
0.159
0.376**
0.001
Thousands)
(0.15)
(0.17)
(0.16)
(0.01)
Bias-Adjusted β
-0.019
0.199
0.456
0.002
(δ=1)
Bias-Adjusted β
(δ=1) within 2.8
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Standard Errors
of Controlled β?
δ (β = 0)
1.717
-6.923
-5.594
-1.166
δ>1 ?
Yes
No
No
No
R2
0.27
0.31
0.39
0.19
N
400
417
687
756
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14. The Effect of Amount of Student Loan Debt (in Tens of Thousands of
2015 $s) on Employment Status.
Not in Labor
Retired
Unemployed
Employed
Force
Student Loans
(2015 $s, Tens of
-0.004
-0.005
-0.001
0.005
Thousands)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.01)
Bias-Adjusted β
0.001
0.000
-0.001
0.000
(δ=1)
Bias-Adjusted β
(δ=1) within 2.8
No
No
Yes
No
Standard Errors
of Controlled β?
δ (β = 0)
0.856
1.012
3.493
1.717
δ>1 ?
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
R2
0.37
0.3
0.14
0.3
N
763
763
763
763
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 15. The Effect of Amount of Student Loan Debt (in Tens of Thousands of
2015 $s) on Retirement Savings.
Dollars in
Whether Anyone in
IRA/Annuities (Tens
Family has
of Thousands of 2015
IRA/Annuities
$s)
Student Loans (2015 $s, Tens
-1.411**
-0.013
of Thousands)
(0.59)

(0.01)

-1.506

-0.013

Yes

Yes

-58.934

9.762

No

Yes

Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1)
Bias-Adjusted β (δ=1) within
2.8 Standard Errors of
Controlled β?
δ (β = 0)
δ>1 ?
R2
N

0.37
759
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.35
759

coefficient is less than zero, so the robustness of the result is unclear. An
additional $10,000 does not decrease the likelihood of being retired or out of the
labor force in general, nor does it increase the likelihood of employment, unlike
the results in the analyses that looked at student loan debt presence. Having ten
thousand dollars in student loan debt lowers a household’s retirement savings by
$14,110, or a little less than half of a standard deviation in retirement savings. 21 It
is possible this is indicative of selection bias, here too δ < 0, or that there are
compounding effects of reducing IRA contributions, such as losing employer
matching or interest from the account. However, if a parent owed $10,000 on a
PLUS loan with an interest rate of 7.0%22, the total amount a parent would pay
over the entire repayment period of 10 years under the most expensive
repayment plan is $15,025.23
For these base regressions, we report all coefficients outside of fixed
effects in Appendix C in Tables 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38. We next turn to the
robustness checks.
Robustness Checks: Additional Controls
In the next part of the exploration of the effect of student loan debt, we present
the coefficients of interest when a household’s earliest level of wealth is included
(shown in Tables 16 and 17) and coefficients of interest when a parent’s financial
literacy (on a scale from 0 to 6, 6 being the highest) and a parent’s mother’s
education is included (shown in Tables 18 and 19). Financial literacy is measured
by the number of questions concerning financial literacy an individual answered
correctly on a supplemental survey in 2016. Maternal education is included in a
categorical variable that ranges from 1 (elementary education) to 6 (advanced
degree). We only examine employment status because the inclusion of the
additional controls results in the loss of around a hundred observations and
employment status is the dependent variable with the most observations.
Interestingly, in the robustness check with earliest wealth included, the
additional control results in larger coefficient estimates in absolute value and no
loss in significance. However, the estimate when parent’s financial literacy and
mother’s education are included is insignificant and the δ falls below one,
suggesting selection into borrower status may be driven by unobservables,
perhaps unobservable individual characteristics best proxied for by maternal
education and financial literacy.
Robustness Checks: Student Loan Debt and Money Problems
The key issue within this analysis remains the possibility of selection bias, which
the robustness checks suggest may be problematic. One such possibility is that
people with different levels of financial literacy or concern over financial
problems may select into borrower status at different rates. One way that we
addressed this issue is by including a measure of financial literacy in the
The standard deviation for IRA dollars is $33,180.
An interest rate of 7.0% is the PLUS loan interest rate for the 2017-2018 school year.
23 Calculations using Federal Student Aid’s Repayment Estimator (Federal Student Aid, 2018).
21

22
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Table 16. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Employment Status,
Controlling for Earliest Wealth Available.
Retired
Not in Labor Force Unemployed
Employed
Any Student
-0.034
-0.063*
-0.019
0.063*
Loans
(0.024)
(0.034)
(0.014)
(0.034)
Bias-Adjusted
-0.006
-0.033
-0.017
0.033
β (δ=1)
Bias-Adjusted
β (δ=1)
within 2.8
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Standard
Errors of
Controlled β?
δ (β = 0)
1.194
1.978
5.735
1.979
δ>1 ?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
R2
0.37
0.34
0.18
0.34
N
596
596
596
596
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 17. The Effect of Amount of Student Loan Debt on Employment Status,
Controlling for Earliest Wealth Available.
Retired
Not in Labor Force Unemployed
Employed
Student
0.000
-0.002
-0.001
0.002
Loans (2015
$s, Tens of
Thousands)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.004)
Bias-Adjusted
0.004
0.003
-0.001
-0.003
β (δ=1)
Bias-Adjusted
β (δ=1)
within 2.8
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Standard
Errors of
Controlled β?
δ (β = 0)
0.034
0.393
2.572
0.392
δ>1 ?
No
No
Yes
No
2
R
0.37
0.35
0.18
0.35
N
590
590
590
590
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Employment Status,
Controlling for Parent’s Financial Literacy and Parent’s Mother’s Education.
Retired Not in Labor Force
Unemployed
Employed
Any Student
-0.023
-0.052
-0.020
0.052
Loans
(0.031)
(0.041)
(0.019)
(0.041)
Bias-Adjusted
0.024
0.000
-0.018
0.000
β (δ=1)
Bias-Adjusted
β (δ=1) within
2.8 Standard
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Errors of
Controlled β?
δ (β = 0)
0.510
0.997
5.926
1.000
δ>1 ?
No
No
Yes
No
2
R
0.45
0.36
0.24
0.36
N
461
461
461
461
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 19. The Effect of Amount of Student Loan Debt on Employment Status,
Controlling for Parent’s Financial Literacy and Parent’s Mother’s Education.
Retired Not in Labor Force
Unemployed
Employed
Student Loans
0.002
0.002
0.000
-0.002
(2015 $s, Tens
of Thousands)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.002)
(0.005)
Bias-Adjusted β
0.009
0.011
0.001
-0.011
(δ=1)
Bias-Adjusted β
(δ=1) within 2.8
Standard
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Errors of
Controlled β?
δ (β = 0)
-0.377
-0.256
0.304
-0.255
δ>1 ?
No
No
No
No
2
R
0.45
0.37
0.24
0.37
N
455
455
455
455
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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robustness check above. Below, we also address it by seeing if student loan debt
in the current period is a significant predictor of financial problems in the past.
The measure of financial problems used here is from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics’s 1996 Main Family survey. Within the 1996 survey, the PSID
asked several questions about levels of financial distress within a family. From
this financial distress data, we create an indicator for if an individual is a member
of a family in 1996 that experienced one or more of six types of financial distress:
the family (1) was unable to pay bills, (2) obtained a loan to pay off debts, (3) had
creditors call, (4) had wages garnished, (5) had a lien on property, or (6) had
property repossessed. In Tables 20 and 21 we present the relationship between
student loan debt and the presence of money problems in the past. To attempt to
ameliorate the possibility that the presence of historical money problems could
decrease a family’s ability to borrow student loans or increase the need to borrow,
we only include observations where the latest child’s college entrance year is at
least five years after 1996.24
We find evidence that families with a history of financial problems are more
likely to have student loan debt present in the household although we do not find
an effect on the amount of student loan debt within the household. Taken with
the robustness checks presented above, this indicates there may be systematic
differences between parents in borrowing families and parents in non-borrowing
families. In particular, we find evidence of a positive selection bias: families that
have had money problems in the past are more likely to take out student loans,
and these families may then be more likely to work longer, save less, and expect
to retire later.

Conclusion
This paper is a first attempt to identify the effect of student loans on parents’
outcomes, while also engaging in formal tests of robustness to determine if the
results can be construed as causal. We examine the effect of student loan
presence in the household on parents’ retirement behaviors, expectations, and
savings. Results indicate the presence of loans in the household significantly
impacts retirement decisions along a number of dimensions: loan presence
increases the likelihood a parent is in the labor force and employed and decreases
the dollars in a household’s IRA. An additional $10,000 in student loan debt
amount increases expected retirement age by 5 months and decreases IRA dollars
by $14,000. However, we find evidence a household’s loan status is driven by
previous financial hardship status. Further, a technique developed by Oster raises
the possibility that results may be driven by a selection issue.
Given that our results indicate significant effects of student loans on
parents on a number of margins, but that we cannot establish causality with
certainty, it is an area ripe for more research. More research, however, calls for
more and better data. While parent PLUS loans are included in the Title IV
24

The credit check used for PLUS loans includes a five-year lookback for adverse credit history.
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Table 20. Presence of Any Student Loan Debt as a Predictor for Historical Money
Problems.
Any 1996 Money Problems
Any Student Loans
0.114*
(0.062)
R2
0.23
N
635
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 21. Amount of Student Loan Debt as a Predictor for Historical Money
Problems.
Any 1996 Money Problems
Student Loans (2015 $s, Tens of
0.011
Thousands)
(0.011)
R2
0.22
N
628
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Volume Reports25, they are not included in College’s ScoreCards, unlike loans
taken out by students. Further, surveys frequently used to examine the effect of
post-secondary funding on later outcomes (like Baccalaureate & Beyond) solely
examine students. We hope that this first effort will lead to greater attention and
study focused on the parental PLUS loan program, both by policymakers and by
researchers.

25

Found at https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/title-iv.
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CHAPTER 3
MERIT AID & FAMILY DEBT IN LOTTERY SCHOLARSHIP
STATES
Introduction
During the past few decades, two consistent trends in college financing have
arisen. The first trend is that student loans now make up a much larger portion of
the average student’s college financing portfolio: from 1993 to 2014 there was a
40% increase in the number of college graduates who had borrowed student
loans to fund their education. During the same time period, many states rolled
out large scale merit-based scholarships. The interaction of these concurrent
changes is the subject of this paper: I examine the effect of lottery scholarship
eligibility on a broad measure of debt within a family, which includes student
loans and credit card bills as well as other debt, using a simple difference-indifference analysis.
Georgia introduced the first lottery-based merit aid scholarship in 1993
(Tennessee Higher Education Commission, 2016). Since the introduction of
Georgia’s HOPE scholarship, eight states have rolled out lottery-based merit aid
scholarships. These lottery scholarships are differentiated from other merit aid
scholarships not only by their funding source (a state lottery) but also because of
their relatively generous aid packages. Sjoquist & Winter (2014) categorize all
states with lottery scholarships as “strong merit aid states,” taking both the level
of scholarship aid and the percent of students who qualify into account.26 I list
these states, and the date that the state began disbursing lottery scholarships, in
Table 22.
Lottery scholarships have a few clear purposes. The Tennessee Hope
Scholarship program’s purpose is explicitly “to provide access for Tennesseans to
post-secondary education, to improve high school and collegiate academic
achievement, to keep more of the best and brightest students in Tennessee, and
to provide social and economic benefits to the state of Tennessee” (Tennessee
Higher Education Commission, 2016). There is a large literature on the firstorder impact of lottery scholarships. However, the impact of merit aid
scholarships in general on debt uptake and amount is relatively understudied and
the subject of only one published paper and two working papers thus far. During
this time of rapidly increasing college tuitions, falling levels of state and federal
funding for higher education, and rising student loan debt, the impact of meritbased financial aid on debt is worthy of attention.
Previous literature on student loan debt has found that student loans
impact borrowers’ decisions more than would be predicted by economic models
since student loans (even those in tens of thousands of dollars) represent a small

Of the “strong merit aid states” that Sjoquist & Winter (2014) identify, only Nevada does not
have a lottery scholarship.
26
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Table 22. Lottery Scholarship States Included in the Analyses & The Scholarship’s
Implementation Year.27
Lottery Scholarship Implementation
State
Year
Georgia
1993
Florida
1997
New Mexico
1997
South Carolina
1998
Louisiana
1998
Kentucky
1999
West Virginia
2002
Tennessee
2004
amount of the typical college-going person’s lifetime income. Nevertheless, the
literature has found that student loans impact career choices, decrease overall
levels of wealth, and decrease the likelihood that an individual will be married
(Rothstein & Rouse, 2011; Field, 2009; Cooper & Wang, 2014; Gicheva, 2016). In
addition, descriptive analyses have found that student loan borrowers have
higher levels of credit card debt than non-borrowers and higher debt-tohousehold-income (Fry, 2014).
Does merit aid lead to lower debt levels for young adults? I seek to answer
this question and add to the research in this area using a difference-in-difference
analysis to examine the effect of lottery scholarships on a broad measure of debt
that includes not only student loan debt but also credit card debt, medical bills,
legal bills, and loans from relatives. I define treated individuals as those who were
enrolled in a cohort in college during which a lottery scholarship was available in
their state of residence. I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), a panel that has been running since 1968 and specifically collected
information on a broad measure of debt (credit card charges, student loans,
medical and legal bills, and loans from relatives) in 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999 to
2015. The longer time frame of this panel allows me to use a difference-indifference methodology that takes advantage of variation in the rollout of these
programs both across time and across states. The methodology and dataset
enable me to examine multiple cohorts and the effect of these scholarships on all
treated individuals who attended college, not only those who graduated, and the
effect of these scholarships on a broad debt measure.
The results of the analyses suggest that merit aid scholarships do not lower
debt levels or the likelihood of debt uptake. These insights add to a literature that
has found divergent results through the use of a broader debt measure and an
analysis that examines a longer timeframe, both college graduates and nongraduates, and multiple states.

27

Source: Sjoquist & Winters (2014), Table 1.
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Literature Review
The other related papers on this topic have all approached this question in
slightly different ways. Chen and Wiederspan (2014), the first paper to examine
this question, utilize the Baccalaureate & Beyond 2000/2001 data survey of 1999
– 2000 graduates. During this time, only Georgia (whose HOPE program was the
first strong merit aid program, as defined by Sjoquist and Winters (2014)) would
have treated graduates to be surveyed. Chen and Wiederspen examine the impact
of merit aid (in general rather than only large-scale merit aid) on student
borrowing. They find that when Georgia is included in the analysis, merit aid
significantly lowers student borrowing; however, when Georgia is excluded, this
significance disappears. They dub this “the Georgia Effect”: “This finding may
imply that the relationship between state non-need (merit) aid and graduates’
debt burden in Georgia was so strong that it drove the results for all state related
covariates” (Chen & Wiederspan, 2014, pg. 585). Why would this be the case? The
authors found that Georgia’s merit aid level was several times larger in
magnitude than the average state’s; they propose such a large level of merit aid
decreases student loan uptake.
A working paper by Chapman (2015) also utilizes a later Baccalaureate &
Beyond survey of the 2008 – 2009 graduating cohort, so the examined cohort
contains a larger number of students who would have been exposed to a largescale scholarship and these students have greater geographic variation than in
Chen & Wiederspan (2014). Chapman uses differing ACT score eligibility
thresholds for both a difference-in-difference analysis and a regression
discontinuity analysis. Because she uses the ACT score eligibility threshold, she
restricts the merit aid states she examines to those that use the ACT (or
comparable SAT) as a criterion of eligibility. In the difference-in-difference
analysis, she exploits variation over state and over ACT score (i.e., a graduate is
“treated” if their ACT score is at or above the ACT cutoff and their state has a
merit aid scholarship). She finds a consistent negative effect of merit aid
eligibility on student loan amount; merit aid significantly reduces the amount of
student loan debt the average student will borrow in both analysis types. In the
regression discontinuity analysis, aid eligibility reduces total loan amount by
between $7200 and $7600; in the difference-in-difference analysis, aid eligibility
reduces total loan amount by between $5800 and $6400. She finds evidence for
a reduction in the likelihood of loan uptake of around 8 percentage points with
the difference-in-difference analysis but no significant effect with the regression
discontinuity approach.
Because both Chapman (2015) and Chen & Weiderspan (2016) use the
Baccalaureate & Beyond data, they are only able to examine college graduates.
Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2016) use a unique data set from West Virginia that
links students’ academic information with later-in-life credit information.
Interestingly, they find greater effects of student loans on the intensive margin
rather than the extensive margin, in contrast to Chapman (2015). Like Chapman
(2015), they use graduates’ ACT scores as the discontinuity in a regression
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discontinuity analysis and a difference-in-difference analysis with ACT score as
one source of treatment variation but the other source they exploit is college
entrance year rather than state (i.e. they view a student as “treated” with West
Virginia’s PROMISE scholarship if the student met the eligibility threshold and
began college in a year when the PROMISE was available). Within the regression
discontinuity results, Scott-Clayton and Zafar find that the West Virginia
PROMISE does decrease the likelihood of student loan debt uptake (by around 7
percentage points). However, they do not find an effect on the average dollar
amount of student loan debt that a graduate has because there are countervailing
effects: likely PROMISE recipients borrow significantly fewer loans at the
undergraduate level but are significantly more likely to attend graduate school
and borrow more loans at the graduate level than unlikely PROMISE recipients.
The difference-in-difference analysis indicates lower likelihood of student loan
uptake but not with the consistency of the regression discontinuity, suggesting
the local average treatment effect and the average treatment effect may be
dissimilar. In addition, Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2016) also measure the effect of
merit aid scholarships on credit card balances. They do not find any significant
effect.

Model
The difference-in-difference approach I propose uses both geographic variation
and time variation. My estimating equation is as follows
Yi =α+β(MeritStates *Aftert )+θ(StateFEs )+ϑ(EntranceYearFEt )+Xi φ+ui
In this estimation, 𝑌𝑖 is a broad debt measure within the household that
individual i physically resides in during the most recent survey after the student
has stopped attending college. This debt measure includes student loans, credit
card bills, medical bills, legal bills, and loans from relatives. I control for state
and cohort fixed effects and consider individuals as “treated” with eligibility for a
merit aid scholarship if they entered college in a state-year where a lottery
scholarship would be available. Xi is a vector of student characteristics, including
demographics (age when debt surveyed, gender, and race), the distance between
the person’s college exit year and year their debt was surveyed, the total years of
college education for all individuals within the household, and the individual’s
father’s education level.28 All analyses use robust standard errors and personlevel weights.
The key threat to identification in any difference-in-difference analysis is
the validity of the control group. If the control group and the treated group do not
have parallel trends in counterfactual outcomes once observables are accounted
for, then any estimated impacted of treatment may not be the result of a policy
change but of differing paths altogether. In this study, a plausible threat to
Unfortunately, the Main Family PSID does not contain information on student’s high school
performance or SAT or ACT score to control for a student’s academic characteristics prior to
college. I include parental education as a proxy for the importance of education within the family.
28
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identification would be if an underlying trend in student financing was occurring
in states that introduced lottery scholarships that was not occurring in states that
did not introduce them. I examine the results visually and econometrically with
an event study design. I do not find any evidence of different pre-existing trends
– instead, both pre- and post-treatment years display significant amounts of
noise for either amount of debt or debt presence.
An additional worry with this particular analysis is that states’ lottery
scholarships may have changed the student makeup within the state. Perhaps
large scale scholarships lessen “brain drain” (the phenomenon of higher ability
students attending out-of-state schools) or encourage students to enroll in college
who otherwise would not have attended. I do not address either of these
possibilities directly in my analyses, but previous literature in general indicates
that large scale scholarships do not affect most students’ choice to attend college
although it may change their sector choice (Bruce & Carruthers, 2014; Goodman,
2008). The literature does suggest that effects are more pronounced for low
income students and thus need-based aid programs may have greater impact on
college choice than merit-based: Kane (2003) finds a significant effect on
enrollment decisions when examining the effect of a California scholarship
program based on both merit and need.

Data
The data I use to explore the effect of large-scale merit aid on a broad measure of
debt is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a nationally
representative survey that has followed families since 1968; currently the PSID is
given every other year to participating families. PSID families answer both
Individual and Main Family surveys each year.
The PSID is suited for the purposes of this study because the survey
contains information both about a family’s state of residence each year and debt
presence and amount (student loan debt grouped with a small set of other debt
types in 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999 to 2009, and separated subcategories for
2011 to 2015). Below I detail how I treat these debt variables.
The PSID collects information both about the presence of debt (“…do you
(or anyone in your family living there) currently have any other debts…?”) and
about the amount of debt (“If you added up all of these debts (for all of your
family living there), about how much would they amount to right now?”). The
“other debt” measure the PSID used prior to 2011 explicitly asked about student
loan debt, credit card debt, medical bills, legal bills, and loans from relatives
combined, but as is shown below, within my sample student loan debt is the
largest average debt amount and it and credit card debt are the most prevalent.
This data comes with two important caveats: (1) the Main Family survey asks the
amount of any debt for all members of a household rather than individually (i.e.,
“If you added up all student loans for all of your family living there, about how
much would they amount to right now?”), and (2) the Main Family survey data
only collects information about college exit year, years of college completed, and
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year of high school graduation, not college entrance year. This is problematic
because merit aid eligibility rests on assumptions about college entrance year
(merit aid programs are implemented in a specific year, and individuals are
assumed eligible based on when they enter college). I impute college entrance
year using earliest college exit minus the years of college completed in the same
survey year. This proxy for college entrance will be accurate if an individual does
not take breaks during her college career. To bolster this analysis, I also use an
alternative proxy for college entrance year, high school graduation year. High
school graduation year may be a more accurate proxy for college entrance, but
the PSID has only collected data on high school graduation in 2015, so the sample
size is significantly smaller.
Both the advantage and disadvantage of using the broad debt measure
data is the ability to examine the effect of large-scale merit aid not on student
loan debt in particular but on the effect of large-scale merit aid on a more general
measure of debt that includes credit card debt. However, this broad debt measure
does not allow me to examine any dynamics that exist between types of debt. For
example, if individuals treated with merit aid are less likely to take out student
loans but more likely to take out credit card debt (or vice versa), the following
analyses will be unable to pick up on those effects.
However, using this debt measure allows the creation of an analysis that
goes back much further in time than using a student loan specific measure: the
question about other debt was asked in 1984, 1989, 1994, and then every survey
from 1999 through 2009. For 2011, 2013, and 2015, I construct a proxy variable
for this larger debt variable using the separate measures for the five debt types. I
assign the debt to a person for the most recent year after their college exit where I
observe their debt level. Individuals in the 99th percentile of indebtedness are
dropped so that outliers do not drive results. All variables in dollars have been
transformed into constant 2015 dollars.
Within the Main Family data, debt is surveyed at the level of the household
rather than individual, so I allow fractional measures of merit aid treatment.
Families in the analysis for whom I can readily assign as having been exposed to a
large-scale merit aid program or not in the family’s entirety are simply coded 0
(not treated) or 1 (treated). I allow fractional treatment if members of a family
have differing exposure (i.e., if a Head was not treated with aid eligibility but his
Spouse was).
I present the summary statistics for the data in Table 23. About 11.5% of
the sample was treated and began college in a year when a merit aid scholarship
was available. Most of the sample has some form of other debt, and the average
amount of debt, including those with no debt at all, is just over $15,100. The
average person in the sample began college in about 1998, which indicates that
there is a fair amount of variation within state because in 1998 five of the eight
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Table 23. Summary Statistics for Sample.
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Any Other Debt
.7227666 .4477618
Amount Real Other
15118.99 20827.35
Debt (2015 )
Scholarship Possible
.1146974 .3001107
Earliest College
1997.918 7.433334
Beginning
College State (FIPS)
24.01787 13.55582
Distance between
College Exit and
2.208646
1.11156
Survey
Age
23.49625
5.3859
Female
.6069164 .488576
Years in College
3.718732 2.244401
(Household)
Father’s Education:
No High School
.1348703 .3416835
Diploma
Father’s Education:
High School
.5394813 .4985825
Graduate, no
Bachelor’s Degree
Father’s Education:
Bachelor’s Degree
.3256484 .4687517
Recipient or Higher
Race: White
.6789625 .4670098
Race: Black
.2945245 .4559601
Race: Other Race
.026513 .1607013
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large scale merit aid scholarships would have launched. The sample skews more
female, but this is reflective of the fact more women attend college than men.29
The final analyses end up with a sample size of 1,735. Of the 77,000
individuals within the PSID, only 3,000 have information on debt, college
enrollment, and college state. Only a little over half of this number have nonmissing information for the rest of the variables included.
Information about subcategories of debt is available in 2011, 2013, and
2015. In Figure 3, I present a breakdown of the percent of individuals that have
each of the five subcategories of debt that make up the broad measure of debt. In
Figure 4, I present a breakdown of the average amount of debt for those five
subcategories for all individuals.
Note that within this sample, student loan debt is both the most likely
subcategory of debt to be present and the subcategory of debt with the largest
average amount. Credit card debt is a close second to student loan debt in terms
of presence, but the average credit card debt never exceeds $5,000 in any of the
years subcategory information is available for and the average amount of student
loan debt never falls below $15,000. Two of the other debt types, legal bills and
loans from relatives, have such a low average amount they are difficult to identify
in the graphs.

Results
I analyze the effect of large scale lottery scholarships using a difference-indifference analysis on the presence and amount of a broad measure of debt that
includes credit card bills, student loan debt, medical bills, legal bills, and loans
from relatives. Table 24 shows the effect of enrolling in college in a state-year
where a lottery scholarship was available; in Table 24 I use an estimate of college
entrance year where entrance year is assumed to be the last year a person
attended college less the years of college completed.
None of the coefficients of interest are statistically significant. The results
do not indicate that lottery scholarship availability when an individual begins
college effects the likelihood the individual’s family will experience an increase or
decrease in the presence of debt, debt amount, or logged debt (which would
capture a percent change in debt). These insignificant coefficients are negative, in
line with the significant findings within the previous literature. The magnitudes
of these estimates would indicate that families with individuals with scholarship
eligibility are slightly less likely to have debt (0.6 percentage points less likely),
on average have about $1,801 less in debt, and a 17.4% decrease in the amount of
debt, all else equal. The magnitude of the amount of debt result are similar to the

See https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=72 for a breakdown of degree recipients both
by race and by gender.
29
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Percent of Sample With Debt
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Figure 3. Any Debt for Individuals in Sample, Broken Down by Subcategories and
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Figure 4. Average Amount of Debt for Individuals in Sample, by Subcategories
and Years.
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Table 24. Effect of Lottery Scholarship Availability on Debt; College Exit Year
Less Years College Completed Used as College Entrance Year.
Amount Real
Log of Amount Real Other
Any Other
Other Debt
Debt (2015) (=0 if Amount
Debt
(2015)
of Real Other Debt =0)
Scholarship
-0.00666
-1,801
-0.174
Available
(0.0737)
(3,447)
(0.696)
2
R
0.114
0.170
0.097
N
1,735
1,735
1,735
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
regression discontinuity estimate found by Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2016), who
find that West Virginia PROMISE scholarship recipients had $1,400 less
undergraduate debt on average, but the magnitude is about five times smaller
than those found by Chapman (2015). Additionally, effect size of merit aid on
debt presence is much smaller than that found by Chapman (2015) or ScottClayton and Zafar (2016), both of which found effect sizes of around 8 percentage
points.
One caveat to this result is that this analysis uses an imputed college
entrance year. Because college entrance year determines if a person is treated
with scholarship eligibility, college entrance year is central to the analysis. Below,
I present another set of regressions in Table 25 where the individual’s college
entrance year is treated as the year she graduated high school. The pairing of the
two analyses is also informative because the use of an imputed college entrance
year is likely to create some false positives (individuals who entered college in
lottery scholarship states and took a break during college that the researcher
cannot observe actually entered college prior to the implementation of the lottery
scholarship, would incorrectly be designated as “lottery scholarship eligible”),
whereas the use of the high school graduation year as the college entrance year is
likely to create false negatives (individuals who delayed college entrance in lottery
scholarship states and graduated high school prior to the lottery scholarship
program but did not enter college until after the implementation of the
scholarship, would be incorrectly designated “lottery scholarship ineligible”).
Although a few hundred observations are lost due to this scholarship
eligibility question (“When did you graduate high school?”) only being asked in
the 2015 survey, this second analysis supports the results of the first. The
presence of the broad debt measure, the amount of debt in levels, and amount of
debt in logs are not significantly affected by large scale merit aid scholarship
eligibility, even with the alternative college entrance year measure, although the
magnitudes are uniformly larger. Results with all coefficients except state and
year fixed effects for both analyses can be found in Appendix D in Tables 39 and
40.
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Table 25. Effect of Lottery Scholarship Availability on Debt; High School
Graduation Year Used as College Entrance Year.
Log of Amount Real Other Debt
Any Other
Amount Real
(2015) (=0 if Amount of Real
Debt
Other Debt (2015)
Other Debt =0)
Scholarship
-0.0811
-4,920
-0.795
Available
(0.0992)
(4,474)
(0.994)
2
R
0.140
0.198
0.127
N
1,325
1,325
1,325
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The magnitude of the effect of scholarship eligibility on debt presence is in
line with that found in previous literature (Chapman, 2015; Scott-Clayton &
Zafar, 2016), and the effect of scholarship
eligibility on debt amount is within the fairly large range within the previous
literature. Chapman (2015) found a reduction in student loan debt amount
between $7,500 and $6,000 when a student was likely to be treated with a merit
aid scholarship; Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2016) found a reduction in
undergraduate student loan debt of $1,400 but an increase in graduate student
loan debt.
In addition to these analyses, I present graphs of event studies in Figure 5
and Figure 6. I do this to examine the possibility there is some type of trend
occurring around the implementation year – perhaps debt initially falls with the
availability of lottery scholarship funds, but as institutions adjust to the influx of
dollars, tuition rises and so does the level of student borrowing. In both event
study figures, t = 0 signifies the implementation year of the lottery scholarship,
and t = -1 (the year prior to the scholarship’s implementation) is the omitted year.
Both event studies use imputed college entrance (college exit year less years in
college) because of the larger sample size.
The event studies exhibit a significant amount of noise, both before and
after the implementation of the lottery scholarship. In addition, the effect of the
lottery scholarship is visually centered on zero and zero is always within the 95%
confidence intervals for each t, regardless of if the graph is examining the
presence of debt or the amount of debt.
In summary, I do not find any evidence that lottery scholarships lower the
amount of debt or likelihood of debt uptake. I examine the relationship
analytically, using two different measures of college entrance year, and visually
and econometrically with an event study. I discuss why these results may diverge
from those found in the previous literature in the conclusion.
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Figure 5. Presence of Broad Debt Measure.

Figure 6. Amount of Debt (2015 $’s).
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Conclusion
Previous literature has found some evidence of lower levels and uptake of student
loan debt when individuals are treated with large amounts of merit aid. Chen and
Wiederspan (2014) found a significant effect of merit aid on student loans only
when Georgia, the only state with a large merit aid program in existence during
the cohort that Chen and Wiederspan examined, was included. Scott-Clayton and
Zafar (2016), meanwhile, find evidence within their regression discontinuity
analysis of decreased student loan uptake and lower amounts borrowed at the
undergraduate level, and increased student loan uptake and higher amounts
borrowed at the graduate level.
It is possible that, because the analyses presented here cannot distinguish
between undergraduate and graduate borrowing, the contrasting impact end up
masking any true significant effect. It is also possible that the analyses presented
here cannot distinguish between the different types of debt within the debt
measure and thus any substitution from student loans to credit card debt or vice
versa is masked. However, the finding that families where individuals are treated
with merit aid do not have lower or higher levels of total debt remains important,
suggesting that merit aid does not lead to lower debt levels on average.
The diverging results within this literature emphasize that there is still
much to be learned about the way individuals shape their college financing
portfolios. Both student loan debt and these large merit aid scholarships make up
billions of dollars of higher education spending: in the 2016-2017 school-year,
over $58 billion dollars in student loans were disbursed to undergraduate
students, and South Carolina alone disbursed over $100 million in aid with its
Hope scholarship program (College Board, 2018; South Carolina Commission on
Higher Education, 2018). Both policymakers and the public would benefit from
further research on the way that merit aid scholarships interact with other
sources of funding, especially debt.
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Appendix A
Table 26. Base Results with Differing Incidence Measures – No States Dropped
Regardless of Number of State-Weeks Available.
Polio Incidence: Average Weekly Incidence In Twelve Month Period
(1)
(2)
(3)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.019 -0.016
-0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
2
R
0.14
0.33
0.34
N
125,716 125,716 125,716
Polio Incidence: Total Incidence In Twelve Month Period
(4)
(5)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
R2
0.14
0.33
N
125,716 125,716
Polio Incidence: Maximum Incidence In Twelve Month Period
(7)
(8)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
0
0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
2
R
0.14
0.33
N
125,716 125,716
Polio Incidence: Minimum Incidence In Twelve Month Period
(10)
(11)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.17
-0.152
(0.16)
(0.14)
2
R
0.14
0.33
N
125,716 125,716
State & Year Fixed Effects
x
x
Epidemiological Controls
x
x
Demographic Characteristics
x

(6)
0.00
0.00
0.34
125,716
(9)
0.001
(0.00)
0.34
125,716
(12)
-0.071
(0.13)
0.34
125,716
x
x
x

Head of Household & Family Characteristics

x

Median Years of School Control
Family Characteristics
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

x
x
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Table 27. Main Results with Probabilistic Regressions.
(1)
(2)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.058**
-0.055***
(0.03)
(0.02)
Log Pseudolikelihood
-5,435,076.45 -4,337,607.97
N
95,839
95,839
State & Year Fixed Effects
x
x
Epidemiological Controls
x
x
Demographic Characteristics
x
Head of Household & Family
Characteristics
Median Years of School
Control
Family Characteristics
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(3)
-0.048**
(0.02)
-4,270,197.76
95,839
x
x
x
x
x
x

Table 28. Base Results with Varying Thresholds for the Number of State-Week
Observations Necessary to be Included in the Regression.
Missing Weeks: 10 Weeks (19.2%)
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.058**
-0.051**
-0.031
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
(0.024)
(0.020)
(0.020)
2
0.10
0.36
0.37
R
53,303
53,303
53,303
N
Missing Weeks: 18 Weeks (34.6%)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.053*
-0.056**
-0.045*
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
2
R
0.15
0.36
0.37
N
77,261
77,261
77,261
Missing Weeks: 26 Weeks (50%)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.013
-0.01
-0.005
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
2
R
0.14
0.33
0.34
N
120,476
120,476
120,476
Missing Weeks: 39 Weeks (75%)
(10)
(11)
(12)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.019
-0.015
-0.009
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
2
R
0.14
0.33
0.34
N
125,027
125,027
125,027
State & Year Fixed Effects
x
x
x
Epidemiological Controls
x
x
x
Demographic Characteristics
x
x
Head of Household & Family
x
Characteristics
Median Years of School Control
x
Family Characteristics
x
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 29. Main Regression with All Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed
Effects.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Polio Incidence Per 100,000
-0.041
-0.041*
-0.035
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Median Years of Schooling (State-Year) -0.021***
0.011***
-0.011***
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Female
0.014***
0.444***
0.011***
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.00)
Age
0
0.025*
0.445***
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.02)
Black
-0.002**
-0.039
0.038***
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.01)
Other Race
-0.015**
-0.02
(0.01)
(0.03)
Occupational Score of Head
0.011***
0.002***
(0.00)
0.00
Female Head
0
0.041***
(0.00)
(0.01)
Head Employed in Agriculture
-0.001*
-0.041***
(0.00)
(0.01)
Both Parents Foreign
0.012
(0.01)
Number of Siblings
-0.006***
(0.00)
Rural
-0.083***
(0.01)
Birth Rate in t (State-Year)
-0.014**
(0.01)
Birth Rate in t-5 (State-Year)
0.011**
(0.00)
Birth Rate in t-6 (State-Year)
-0.001
(0.00)
Percent of Homes with Running Water
-0.002***
(State-Year)
(0.00)
Mother Present in Household
0.013
(0.01)
Father Present in Household
0.024***
(0.01)
R2
0.14
0.34
0.35
N
95,839
95,839
95,839
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 30. No Epidemiological Controls.
(1)
-0.078***
(0.024)
0.14
96,834
x
x

Polio Incidence Per 100,000

(2)
-0.070***
(0.021)
0.34
96,834
X
X
X

R2
N
State & Year Fixed Effects
Epidemiological Controls
Demographic Characteristics
Head of Household & Family
Characteristics
Median Years of School Control
Family Characteristics
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(3)
-0.081***
(0.020)
0.35
96,834
x
x
x
x
x
x

Table 31. No State Fixed Effects.
(1)
0.121
(0.088)
0.09
95,839
x
x

Polio Incidence Per 100,000

(2)
0.126
(0.088)
0.29
95,839
x
x
x

R2
N
State & Year Fixed Effects
Epidemiological Controls
Demographic Characteristics
Head of Household & Family
Characteristics
Median Years of School Control
Family Characteristics
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(3)
0.123
(0.077)
0.31
95,839
x
x
x
x
x
x

Appendix B
Table 32. Variables’ Descriptions and Creation.
Variable
Description & Creation
=1 if individual member of a family in 1996 where they
Any Money Problems
(1) were unable to pay bills, (2) obtained a loan to pay
in 1996
off debts, (3) creditors called, (4) wages garnished, (5)
had a lien on property, or (6) property repossessed
Whether Anyone in
If a family has any student loans. From Main Family
Family has Student
data.
Loans
Amount of Student
Real family student loans in tens of thousands.
Loans in Family in
Transformed from dollars to tens of thousands of
Tens of Thousands of
dollars and in real 2015 dollars.
2015 Dollars
First entrance year of a parent’s last college-entering
child’s college entrance. Uses both Transition to
Adulthood (TA) data + Main Family (MF) data. TA college enrollment year, uses Enrollment Year Recent
College unless Enrollment Year Prior College is both
(a) available and (b) before Enrollment Year Recent
First entrance year of
College. MF - imputed variable for Heads & Spouses;
a parent's latest
created by subtracting Highest Year In College from
entering child
Year Last Attended College. If both TA and MF data
exist for an individual, the earlier year of the two is
used; if earliest year the same for both, MF data is
used. For final analysis, we use the LAST entrance year
a parent is exposed to as our reference point (ie, if a
parent's latest college entrance of a child is 2013, the
entrance year included in the analysis is 2013).
Wealth with equity from the earliest data available for
a parent. In order for it to be pulled, (a) the year with
earliest data availble has to be at least 10 years before
Earliest Wealth
the last child's earliest college entrance year, and (b)
the parent has to be under 40 for the earliest year of
data available. From Main Family File.
If this is a mother (ie, female). Parent/Child pairs
created using Individual Survey's "1968 ID of Mother"
Gender (Female = 1)
(or Father) and "Person # of Mother" (or Father). If
parent-child pair matched on ID of mother, assume
individual female/mother. If parent-chld pair matched
on ID of father, assume individual male/father.
Usual Employment
Individual's own Usual Retirement Age of Others at
Status: Retirement
same firm/with same job if individual Head/Spouse.
Age (Others)
From Main Family File.
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Table 32. Continued.
Variable
Expected Employment
Status: Retirement
Age (Self)
Never Expects to
Retire

Retire Gap

Employment Status:
Retired

Employment Status:
Not in the Labor Force

Employment Status:
Unemployed

Employment Status:
Employed

Description & Creation
Individual's own Age Plan to Stop working if "Actual
age" given and if individual Head/Spouse. Missing if
"Never Retire." From Main Family File.
Created from Age Plan to Stop Working for
Head/Spouse. =1 if individual responds "never" for
age plan to stop working; =0 if actual age given. From
Main Family File.
Distance between the usual retirement age at a firm
("Usual Employment Status: Retirement Age ") and
expected retirement for individual ("Expected
Employment Status: Retirement Age "). Postive if
individual expects to retire before the usual retirement
age at a firm; negative if the individual expects to
retire after the usual retirement age at a firm. Ex: -6
indicates an individual believes they'll retire 6 years
after the typical retirement age at their firm.
If Individual Retired. From Individual Employment
Status. IndEmp =1 if Employment Status =4(retired);
IndEmp =0 if Employment Status =1 (Working Now),
=2(Only temporarily laid off), =3(looking for work,
unemployed), =5(permanently disabled),
=6(HouseSpouse), =7(Student) =8(Other). From
Individual Data File.
If Individual Not in the Labor Force. From Individual
Employment Status. =1 if Employment Status
=4(retired), =5(permanently disabled),
=6(HouseSpouse), =7(Student). =0 if Employment
Status =1(working now), =2(only temporarily laid off),
= 3(looking for work, unemployed) =8(Other). From
Individual Data File.
If Individual Unemployed. From Individual
Employment Status. IndEmp =1 if Employment Status
=3(looking for work, unemployed) ; IndEmp =0 if
Employment Status =1 (Working Now), =2(Only
temporarily laid off), =4(retired), =5(permanently
disabled), =6(HouseSpouse), =7(Student) =8(Other).
From Individual Data File.
From Individual Employment Status. IndEmp =1 if
Employment Status =1 (Working Now); IndEmp =0 if
Unemployed = 1 or Not in Labor Force = 1. From
Individual Data File.
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Table 32. Continued.
Variable
Real 2015 Dollars in
IRA/Annuities
Whether Anyone in
Family has
IRA/Annuities
Age
Social Security
Eligibility

Spouse Present

Real Assets in 2015 $s

Financial Literacy
(Scale = 0-6)

Mother’s Education

Health Status

Description & Creation
From Imputed Value in Annuity/IRA. Made "real IRA
Value" by Inflation-adjustment to 2015 dollars. From
Main Family File.
=1 if Imputed Value IRA > 0; =0 if Imputed Value
IRA = 0. From Main Family File.
Individual's age. From Individual Data File.
=1 if individual's age >= 62; =0 otherwise.
Spouse Present, derived from Couple Status of Head.
Spouse Present=1 if Couple Status of Head = 1 (Head
with wife present in FU), =2 (Head with partner
present in FU), = 3 (Head (female) with husband
present in FU), = 4 (Head with first-year cohabitor
present in FU). SpsPrsnt = 0 if Couple Status of Head
= 5(Head with no wife, partner, husband, or first-year
cohabitor present in FU). From Main Family File.
Real Imputed Assets. Created by adding "imputed
wealth with home equity" and "imputed debts"
together. (ie, undoing the transformation of wealth =
assets - debt). "Imputed debts" is from the Main
Family file; in 2011, 2013, and 2015, when debts were
separated out into categories, we add those categories
together to create a total as in prior PSID surveys (for
2011, imputed debts = credit card + student loan +
medical debt + legal debt + loans from family; in 2013
and 2015, imputed debts = credit card + student loan
+ medical debt + legal debt + loans from family + farm
debt + real estate debt + other debt). Transformed into
real 2015 dollars.
Number out of 6 questions about financial literacy that
an individual got correct. From 2016 Well-Being
Survey.
Mother's latest education available from survey,
categorical (1 = 0-5 grades, 2 = 6-8 grades, 3 = 9-11
grades, 4 = 12 grades, 5 = 12 grades & some
nonacademic training, 6 = some college, 7 = BA, 8 =
advanced degree)
Individual's own Health Status if individual
Head/Spouse.
74

Table 32. Continued.
Variable

Household Income
Less Own Labor
Income in 2015 $s

Number of Children
Matched in College

White

Black

Other Race

Description & Creation
Real household income less individual parent's own
labor income. "Household income" is "Total Family
Income [previous year]" from Main Family data.
Restrict this to positive values only. Because we want
Total Family Income in survey years, if the referenced
year is between 1996 and 2014, we impute the survey
year's Total Famly Income as (1/2)Previous Year's
Total Family Income + (1/2)Next Year's Total Family
Income. (This means we lose 2015, for which there is
no next year of data available.) "Own labor income" is
either "Labor Income [2 Years Previous] for
Head/Spouse" (2015 - 2003) or "Labor Income [1 Year
Previous] for Head/Spouse" (2001 - 1983).
This leaves 1999 and 1997 with labor income
information because in 2001 and 1999, information
was collected for 2000 and 1998, respectfully. Impute
these year's as LaborIncome in Current Year = (1/2)
Labor Income in Previous Year + (1/2)Labor Income
Next Year. (ie, 1999's labor income is (1/2) 2000's
labor income and (1/2) 1998's labor income). Subtract
individual's own labor income from household
income; transform into real 2015 dollars. Because
2015 is unavailable, 2013's is used for individual's
whose reference year is 2015.
Number of children in college a parent was
successfully matched with in the data.
Individual's self-identified race for Heads/Spouses,
from Main Family Survey. White =1 if Race of
Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 1(White). White = 0 if
Race of Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7.
Individual's self-identified race for Heads/Spouses,
from Main Family Survey. Black =1 if Race of
Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 2(Black, AfricanAmerican, or Negro). Black = 0 if Race of
Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7.
Individual's self-identified race for Heads/Spouses,
from Main Family Survey. Other Race =1 if Race of
Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 3(American Indian or
Alaska Native), =4 (Asian), =5 (Native Hawaiian or
Pacific Islander), =7 (Other). Other Race = 0 if Race
of Head/Spouse Mention #1 = 1 or 2.
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Table 32. Continued.
Variable

Total Years of College
for All Children

Description & Creation
Total years of college all of a parent's children
attended; total of a variable for each child called Years
in College. For each child, if "First College Entrance
Year" used is from Main Family data, Years In College
is Main Family's " Highest Year in College for
Head/Spouse" (if child Head/Spouse). If "First College
Entrance Year" from Transition to Adulthood data,
from TA's "Grade Level Completed" (GLC); "Years In
College" =1 if GLC = 14 (One Year college); = 2 if GLC
=15 (two years college); = 3 if GLC = 15 (three years
college); = 4 if GLC = 16; = 5 if GLC = 17. If "Grade
Level Completed" not available for individual where
"First College Entrance Year" is from TA data, then a
proxy created from TA data of "First College Entrance
Year" - 2013 (if individual currently attending school
in 2013) or "First College Entrance Year" - 2011 (if
individual data not available for 2013 and individual
currently attending school in 2011). This proxy is
topcoded at 5 so it matches the other data used to
create Years In College.
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Appendix C
Table 33. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Retirement Expectations, All
Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included.
Others' Usual
Age Expected
Never
Retirement
Retirement
to Retire
Expects to
Gap
Age for Same
(Self)
Retire
Job
Any Student
-0.433
1.13
0.888
0.024
Loans
(0.81)
(0.78)
(0.58)
(0.04)
Mother
0.9
-0.271
-0.541
-0.035
(0.74)
(0.72)
(0.50)
(0.04)
Black
1.184
-1.765
-0.801
-0.04
(1.15)
(1.22)
(0.71)
(0.06)
Other Race
-1.064
1.296
-0.645
0.068
(1.07)
(1.45)
(0.68)
(0.06)
Hispanic
0.541
-1.323
-0.684
-0.072
(1.21)
(1.25)
(0.77)
(0.05)
Household
Income Less
-0.045
-0.082
-0.057**
-0.002
Own Labor
Income
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.00)
Age
0.105
0.169**
0.215***
-0.001
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.06)
-0.004
Spouse Present
-0.08
-1.444
-1.809***
-0.045
(0.94)
(0.97)
(0.61)
(0.05)
Assets in 2015
-0.008***
0.006*
-0.002
0
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.00
Social Security
1.617*
0.221
1.502**
0.098*
Eligibility
(0.96)
(0.96)
(0.67)
(0.06)
Number of
Children in
0.425
0.132
1.096**
0.018
College
(0.83)
(0.78)
(0.49)
(0.04)
Some Children
-4.192***
3.606*
-1.084
-0.181**
Went to HBCU
(1.57)
(1.91)
(1.53)
(0.08)
All Children
Attended
-1.349
1.046
0.112
-0.107
HBCU
(1.36)
(1.60)
(1.24)
(0.08)
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Table 33. Continued.

Some Children
Attended
Private College

Retirement
Gap

Others' Usual
Retirement
Age for Same
Job

Age Expected
to Retire
(Self)

Never
Expects to
Retire

0.04

-1.976*

-1.011

0.528***

(0.96)

(1.03)

(1.35)

(0.10)

All Children
Attended
Private College

-0.527

1.838**

1.134*

0.084

(0.75)

(0.82)

(0.67)

(0.05)

Some Children
Attended ForProfit College

0.361

0.533

1.002

0.383***

(2.72)

(2.32)

(1.11)

(0.09)

All Children
Attended ForProfit College

-2.304*

0.663

-1.302*

0.149*

(1.29)

(1.21)

(0.72)

(0.09)

Some Children
Attended FourYear College

-0.895

0.555

-1.317*

-0.06

(1.37)

(1.18)

(0.74)

(0.06)

All Children
Attended FourYear College

-0.023

0.115

-0.444

0.002

(0.90)

(0.82)

(0.54)

(0.04)

Total Years
Children in
College

-0.082

0.105

0.032

-0.003

(0.15)

(0.15)

(0.10)

(0.01)

0.367

-0.082

1.072*

-0.025

(0.89)

(0.96)

(0.63)

(0.05)

-0.476

-0.101

0.185

-0.066

(0.99)

(1.02)

(0.66)

(0.04)

0.469

-0.461

-0.182

-0.006

(1.16)

(1.09)

(0.75)

(0.06)

Health Status:
Very Good
Health Status:
Good
Health Status:
Fair
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Table 33. Continued.

Health Status:
Poor
R2
N

Retirement
Gap

Others' Usual
Retirement
Age for Same
Job

Age Expected
to Retire
(Self)

Never
Expects to
Retire

-1.868

0.664

1.128

0.151

(2.02)
0.27
401

(1.56)
0.31
418

(1.37)
0.37
691

(0.15)
0.18
761
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Table 34. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Employment Status, All
Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included.
Not in Labor
Retired
Unemployed
Employed
Force
Any Student
-0.035
-0.054*
-0.016
0.055*
Loans
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
Mother
0.027
0.070*
0.018
-0.063
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.04)
Black
-0.023
-0.014
-0.02
0.015
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.05)
Other Race
-0.146***
-0.123**
0.013
0.111**
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.05)
Hispanic
0.026
0.022
0
-0.023
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.02)
(0.06)
Household
Income Less
0.003
0.003
0
-0.003
Own Labor
Income
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Age
0.010***
0.006*
-0.001
-0.005
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Spouse
-0.04
-0.071*
-0.003
0.076*
Present
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.04)
Assets in 2015
0
0
0
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Social
Security
0.112**
0.121**
0
-0.133***
Eligibility
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.05)
Number of
Children in
0
-0.012
-0.007
0.012
College
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.03)
Some Children
Went to
-0.044
-0.115
0.018
0.113
HBCU
(0.10)
(0.13)
(0.03)
(0.12)
All Children
Attended
-0.011
-0.028
0.019
0.024
HBCU
(0.06)
(0.08)
(0.03)
(0.08)
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Table 34. Continued.
Retired

Not in Labor
Force

Unemployed

Employed

Some Children
Attended
Private
College

-0.154*

-0.144

0.055

0.131

(0.08)

(0.11)

(0.05)

(0.11)

All Children
Attended
Private
College

-0.064*

-0.082*

-0.034**

0.082*

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.04)

Some Children
Attended ForProfit College

-0.122*

0.046

0.053

-0.049

(0.07)

(0.10)

(0.05)

(0.10)

0.077

0.061

-0.014

-0.055

(0.07)

(0.09)

(0.03)

(0.09)

-0.022

-0.104

-0.047**

0.110*

(0.05)

(0.07)

(0.02)

(0.07)

0.044

0.024

-0.015

-0.015

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.04)

0.007

0.006

0

-0.005

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.01)

-0.055

-0.059

-0.003

0.062

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.01)

(0.04)

0.018

0.058

0.027

-0.056

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.02)

(0.05)

All Children
Attended ForProfit College
Some Children
Attended
Four-Year
College
All Children
Attended
Four-Year
College
Total Years
Children in
College
Health Status:
Very Good
Health Status:
Good
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Table 34. Continued.
Health Status:
Fair
Health Status:
Poor
R2
N

Retired

Not in Labor
Force

Unemployed

Employed

0.049

0.161**

0.011

-0.170**

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.02)

(0.07)

-0.013

0.159

0.099

-0.194

(0.09)
0.37
771

(0.12)
0.3
771

(0.07)
0.14
771

(0.12)
0.3
771
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Table 35. The Effect of Any Student Loan Debt on Retirement Savings, All
Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included.
Whether Anyone in
Real 2015 Dollars in
Family has
IRA/Annuities
IRA/Annuities
Any Student Loans
-7.004**
-0.074
(3.03)
(0.06)
Mother
0.611
-0.027
(3.43)
(0.05)
Black
-4.649*
-0.129*
(2.79)
(0.07)
Other Race
-2.133
-0.017
(5.71)
(0.07)
Hispanic
-8.723*
-0.253***
(4.52)
(0.07)
Household Income Less
0.598*
0.011***
Own Labor Income
(0.34)
(0.00)
Age
-0.138
0.013***
(0.30)
(0.01)
Spouse Present
0.897
-0.001
(2.58)
(0.05)
Assets in 2015 (Less
0.067***
0
IRA/Annuities)
(0.02)
0.00
Social Security Eligibility
10.603*
0.047
(5.57)
(0.07)
Number of Children in
-2.32
-0.105**
College
(3.52)
(0.05)
Some Children Went to
-8.928
-0.210**
HBCU
(6.99)
(0.11)
All Children Attended
-1.572
-0.129
HBCU
(5.12)
(0.10)
Some Children Attended
-3.601
-0.286**
Private College
(8.90)
(0.12)
All Children Attended
3.681
0.068
Private College
(4.87)
(0.06)
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Table 35. Continued.

Some Children Attended
For-Profit College
All Children Attended
For-Profit College
Some Children Attended
Four-Year College
All Children Attended
Four-Year College
Total Years Children in
College
Health Status: Very
Good
Health Status: Good
Health Status: Fair
Health Status: Poor
R2
N

Real 2015 Dollars in
IRA/Annuities

Whether Anyone in
Family has
IRA/Annuities

-13.350*

-0.336***

(7.14)

(0.10)

1.456

-0.036

(3.98)

(0.08)

0.317

0.096

(4.33)

(0.07)

4.522

0.059

(3.39)

(0.06)

1.357**

0.025***

(0.54)

(0.01)

5.125

-0.029

(4.92)
-1.258
(4.88)
-3.851
(4.87)
-12.030*
(6.25)
0.37
767

(0.06)
-0.107*
(0.06)
-0.113
(0.07)
-0.209*
(0.11)
0.35
767
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Table 36. The Effect of the Amount of Student Loan Debt on Retirement
Expectations, All Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included.
Others'
Usual
Age Expected
Never
Retirement
Retirement
to Retire
Expects to
Gap
Age for
(Self)
Retire
Same Job
Student Loans
(Tens of
-0.041
0.159
0.376**
0.001
Thousands of 2015
$’s)
(0.15)
(0.17)
(0.16)
(0.01)
Mother
0.881
-0.214
-0.532
-0.039
(0.73)
(0.72)
(0.50)
(0.04)
Black
1.175
-1.717
-0.572
-0.039
(1.14)
(1.20)
(0.71)
(0.06)
Other Race
-0.957
1.166
-0.572
0.075
(1.14)
(1.54)
(0.70)
(0.07)
Hispanic
0.606
-1.396
-0.65
-0.064
(1.28)
(1.34)
(0.77)
(0.05)
Household Income
Less Own Labor
-0.046
-0.079
-0.053*
-0.002
Income
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.00)
Age
0.107
0.167**
0.212***
-0.001
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.06)
(0.00)
Spouse Present
-0.14
-1.375
-1.868***
-0.05
(0.95)
(0.97)
(0.63)
(0.05)
Assets in 2015
-0.008**
0.006*
-0.002
0
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.00
Social Security
1.58
0.288
1.557**
0.100*
Eligibility
(0.97)
(0.98)
(0.65)
(0.06)
Number of
Children in
0.442
0.143
1.139**
0.012
College
(0.84)
(0.78)
(0.48)
(0.04)
Some Children
-4.099***
3.340*
-1.334
-0.176**
Went to HBCU
(1.52)
(1.92)
(1.52)
(0.09)
All Children
-1.354
1.043
0.028
-0.112
Attended HBCU
(1.37)
(1.56)
(1.20)
(0.08)
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Table 36. Continued.

Some Children
Attended
Private
College
All Children
Attended
Private
College
Some Children
Attended ForProfit College
All Children
Attended ForProfit College
Some Children
Attended
Four-Year
College
Some Children
Attended
Four-Year
College

Retirement
Gap

Others'
Usual
Retirement
Age for
Same Job

Age Expected
to Retire
(Self)

Never
Expects to
Retire

-0.001

-1.890*

-1.054

0.522***

(0.97)

(1.02)

(1.35)

(0.10)

-0.449

1.720**

1.242*

0.092*

(0.76)

(0.83)

(0.68)

(0.05)

0.3

0.575

1.118

0.387***

(2.76)

(2.29)

(1.10)

(0.09)

-2.260*

0.552

-1.371*

0.150*

(1.30)

(1.26)

(0.76)

(0.09)

-0.854

0.436

-1.463**

-0.055

(1.36)

(1.17)

(0.72)

(0.06)

-0.854

0.436

-1.463**

-0.055

(1.36)

(1.17)

(0.72)

(0.06)

All Children
Attended
Four-Year
College

-0.036

0.132

-0.578

0.005

(0.90)

(0.83)

(0.52)

(0.04)

Total Years
Children in
College

-0.078

0.093

0.021

-0.003

(0.15)

(0.15)

(0.10)

(0.01)
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Table 36. Continued.
Retirement
Gap

Others'
Usual
Retirement
Age for
Same Job

Age Expected
to Retire
(Self)

Never
Expects to
Retire

0.364

-0.075

1.178*

-0.026

(0.89)

(0.96)

(0.63)

(0.05)

-0.503

-0.021

0.236

-0.063

(1.00)

(1.02)

(0.65)

(0.05)

0.471

-0.519

0.038

0.003

Health Status:
Poor

(1.16)

(1.11)

(0.74)

(0.06)

-1.813

0.518

1.286

0.148

R2

(2.01)
0.27
400

(1.49)
0.31
417

(1.45)
0.39
687

(0.15)
0.19
756

Health Status:
Very Good
Health Status:
Good
Health Status:
Fair

N
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Table 37. The Effect of the Amount of Student Loan Debt on Retirement
Expectations, All Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included.
Not in Labor
Retired
Unemployed Employed
Force
Student Loans
(Tens of
-0.004
-0.005
-0.001
0.005
Thousands of
2015 $’s)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.01)
Mother
0.026
0.070*
0.018
-0.063
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.04)
Black
-0.025
-0.017
-0.021
0.018
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.05)
Other Race
-0.149***
-0.122**
0.014
0.110**
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.05)
Hispanic
0.026
0.022
0
-0.023
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.03)
(0.06)
Household
Income Less Own
0.003
0.003
0
-0.003
Labor Income
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Age
0.010***
0.007*
-0.001
-0.006
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Spouse Present
-0.04
-0.078*
-0.004
0.082*
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.04)
Assets in 2015
0
0
0
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Social Security
0.110**
0.119**
0
-0.130**
Eligibility
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.05)
Number of
Children in
-0.004
-0.011
-0.008
0.011
College
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.03)
Some Children
-0.037
-0.113
0.021
0.11
Went to HBCU
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.03)
(0.12)
All Children
-0.015
-0.036
0.016
0.032
Attended HBCU
(0.06)
(0.08)
(0.03)
(0.08)
Some Children
Attended Private
-0.155*
-0.142
0.055
0.129
College
(0.08)
(0.11)
(0.05)
(0.11)
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Table 37. Continued.
All Children
Attended
Private College

Retired

Not in Labor
Force

Unemployed

Employed

-0.066*

-0.076*

-0.033*

0.075*

Some Children
Attended ForProfit College

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.04)

-0.118*

0.06

0.056

-0.063

(0.07)

(0.10)

(0.05)

(0.10)

All Children
Attended ForProfit College

0.082

0.075

-0.014

-0.069

(0.07)

(0.09)

(0.03)

(0.09)

-0.02

-0.101

-0.046*

0.107

(0.05)

(0.07)

(0.02)

(0.07)

0.044

0.023

-0.015

-0.014

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.04)

0.008

0.006

0

-0.005

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.00)

(0.01)

-0.056

-0.062

-0.003

0.064

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.01)

(0.04)

0.016

0.051

0.027

-0.049

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.02)

(0.05)

0.048

0.160**

0.012

-0.169**

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.02)

(0.07)

-0.014

0.153

0.099

-0.188

(0.09)
0.37
763

(0.12)
0.3
763

(0.07)
0.14
763

(0.12)
0.3
763

Some Children
Attended FourYear College
All Children
Attended FourYear College
Total Years
Children in
College
Health Status:
Very Good
Health Status:
Good
Health Status:
Fair
Health Status:
Poor
R2
N
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Table 38. The Effect of the Amount of Student Loan Debt on Retirement Savings,
All Coefficients Except State and Year Fixed Effects Included.
Whether Anyone in
Real 2015 Dollars in
Family has
IRA/Annuities
IRA/Annuities
Student Loans (Tens of
-1.411**
-0.013
Thousands of 2015 $’s)
(0.59)
(0.01)
Mother
0.452
-0.022
(3.49)
(0.05)
Black
-5.573**
-0.135**
(2.79)
(0.07)
Other Race
-2.264
-0.02
(5.81)
(0.07)
Hispanic
-9.301**
-0.258***
(4.64)
(0.07)
Household Income Less
0.603*
0.011***
Own Labor Income
(0.34)
(0.00)
Age
-0.156
0.014***
(0.30)
(0.01)
Spouse Present
0.936
0.002
(2.61)
(0.06)
Assets in 2015 (Less
0.068***
0
IRA/Annuities)
(0.02)
0.00
Social Security Eligibility
10.682*
0.047
(5.55)
(0.07)
Number of Children in
-2.213
-0.101**
College
(3.66)
(0.05)
Some Children Attended
-7.844
-0.202*
HBCU
(6.87)
(0.10)
All Children Attended
-2.056
-0.128
HBCU
(4.98)
(0.10)
Some Children Attended
-2.922
-0.282**
Private College
(8.87)
(0.12)
All Children Attended
3.61
0.056
Private College
(4.95)
(0.06)
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Table 38. Continued.

Some Children Attended
For-Profit College
All Children Attended
For-Profit College
Some Children Attended
Four-Year College
All Children Attended
Four-Year College
Total Years Children in
College
Health Status: Very
Good
Health Status: Good
Health Status: Fair
Health Status: Poor
R2
N

Real 2015 Dollars in
IRA/Annuities

Whether Anyone in
Family has
IRA/Annuities

-12.815*

-0.339***

(7.11)

(0.10)

1.503

-0.036

(3.89)

(0.08)

0.65

0.098

(4.31)

(0.07)

4.876

0.06

(3.40)

(0.06)

1.315**

0.025***

(0.55)

(0.01)

5.104

-0.029

(4.90)
-1.264
(4.87)
-3.832
(4.92)
-12.120*
(6.28)
0.37
759

(0.06)
-0.108*
(0.06)
-0.126*
(0.07)
-0.207*
(0.11)
0.35
759
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Appendix D
Table 39. Effect of Lottery Scholarship Availability on Debt; College Exit Year
Less Years College Completed Used as College Entrance Year, All Coefficients
Except State and Year Fixed Effects.
Amount Real
Log of Amount Real Other
Any Other
Other Debt
Debt (2015) (=0 if Amount
Debt
(2015)
of Real Other Debt =0)
Scholarship
-0.00666
-1,801
-0.174
Available
(0.07)
(3447.00)
(0.70)
Distance between
College Exit and
0.0104
308.9
0.135
Survey
(0.01)
(576.80)
(0.13)
Father's
Education: High
School Graduate,
0.0447
-1,398
0.313
No Bachelor's
Degree
(0.04)
(1996.00)
(0.38)
Father's
Education:
-0.0123
-2,503
-0.392
College Graduate
or Higher
(0.04)
(2311.00)
(0.41)
Race: Black
-0.0105
476.7
0.346
(0.04)
(2092.00)
(0.37)
Race: Other Race
-0.216**
-5,217**
-1.799**
(0.09)
(2501.00)
(0.80)
Age
0.0017
174.6
0.0205
(0.00)
(108.10)
(0.02)
Female
0.0158
887.7
0.414*
(0.03)
(1250.00)
(0.24)
Household Years
0.00972*
2,824***
0.301***
in College
(0.01)
(300.40)
(0.05)
Constant
0.418**
-7,360
2.504
(0.16)
(6251.00)
(1.61)
Observations
1,735
1,735
1,735
R-squared
0.114
0.17
0.097
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Table 40. Effect of Lottery Scholarship Availability on Debt; High School
Graduation Year Used as College Entrance Year, All Coefficients Except State and
Year Fixed Effects.
Log of Amount
Real Other
Amount Real
Any Other
Debt (2015)
Other Debt
Debt
(=0 if Amount
(2015)
of Real Other
Debt =0)
Scholarship Available

-0.0811
(0.10)

-4,920
(4474.00)

-0.795
(0.99)

-0.00593

1,112

0.17

(0.02)

(798.50)

(0.17)

0.0208

-579

0.307

(0.06)

(2827.00)

(0.52)

-0.027

-2,552

-0.422

(0.06)
-0.0532
(0.05)
-0.235**
(0.10)
-0.00558
(0.01)
-0.0153
(0.03)

(3163.00)
747.5
(2666.00)
-7,659***
(2177.00)
1,331***
(282.60)
-102.3
(1382.00)

(0.53)
0.0892
(0.49)
-1.554*
(0.92)
0.117***
(0.04)
0.0647
(0.27)

Household Years in
College

0.0159***

2,706***

0.327***

Constant

(0.01)
0.797***
(0.22)

(367.10)
-42,330***
(9839.00)

(0.06)
1.02
(2.10)

1,325
0.14

1,325
0.198

1,325
0.127

Distance between College
Exit and Survey
Father's Education: High
School Graduate, No
Bachelor's Degree
Father's Education:
College Graduate or
Higher
Race: Black
Race: Other Race
Age
Female

Observations
R-squared
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